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## **Religiosity and Attitudes towards the Involvement of Religious Leaders in Politics: A Multilevel-Analysis of 55 Societies**

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### **ABSTRACT**

This paper examines the antecedents of preferences for the involvement of religious leaders in politics. Hypotheses derived from secularization theories as well as from RC-Frameworks are tested empirically using WVS data. Multilevel-Analysis is used in order to account for the nested structure of the data. Most cross-national differences can be explained by differences in levels of modernization and inequality, with modernization showing a strong negative and inequality showing a strong positive effect. Moreover, stronger state-church relations foster the acceptance of higher involvement of religious leaders in politics. The hypotheses of the RC-Framework are not supported by the evidence. The US' outlying position can be partly explained by high levels of social inequality.

*Key words:* inequality, modernization, secularization theories, religiosity.

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# Religiosity and Attitudes towards the Involvement of Religious Leaders in Politics: A Multilevel-Analysis of 55 Societies

## INTRODUCTION

That modernization reduces religion's role in society and on an individual level has been a scientific truism for a long period of time. The classical view on this relationship can be found in Weber's accounts (cf. Weber 2006a; Weber 2006b), was prominent during the 1960ies (cf. Berger & Luckmann 1966; Berger 1969; Berger & Luckmann 1969) and finds its reflection also in contemporary literature, although in a more relativized form (cf. Bruce 2002; Norris & Inglehart 2004; Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Yet recent developments have cast doubt on classical secularization theory. Widely known examples can be cited: the seize of power by Shiite fundamentalists in Iran (cf. Riesebrodt 1990), the rising influence of Christian fundamentalists in the US (cf. Sterr 1999), the growth of Pentecostal sects in Latin America and Africa (cf. Martin 2005). Some European societies do not seem to fit into the scheme of classical secularization theory, e.g. Poland and Romania (cf. Martin 1978). And apparently it has never been a particular fruitful explanatory model for the US (cf. Greeley 1980; Stark 1991). Casanova (1994) states that "Religion is reclaiming the public sphere".

Probably most surprising for most observers is the high interconnection of religion and politics in the fore mentioned examples. But are these examples representative for the religiosity and attitudes that people hold towards the relationship between religion and politics on a large scale? How accurate are classical and newer secularization frameworks in explaining individual secularization? This paper aims to test hypotheses derived from secularization theories as well as hypotheses from the main rivalling theory, the supply side approach of religion. Individual religiosity and attitudes towards the relationship between religious leaders in politics are considered to be part of the process, which has been called "secularization in mind" by Dobbelaere (2002).

In contrast to other work that has been conducted in this area (cf. Carlson & Listhaug 2006; Yuchtman-Yaar & Alkalay 2007), possible cultural differences will not get as much attention in this paper. Instead the "existential security framework", put forward by Inglehart and Norris (2004), shall deserve greater attention, especially the role of social inequality and its effects on individual secularization. The outlying position of the USA, both in respect to levels of religiosity and preferences towards religious leaders in politics, is important in this respect, because one of Norris' and Inglehart's explanations for this are higher levels of insecurity existing in the US. This explanation shall be examined in greater detail as has been done up to now by Norris and Inglehart themselves.

The paper will proceed on the following lines: First, I will give an overview about classical secularization theories, the RC-Paradigm of sociology of religion and Norris' and

Inglehart's framework. Secondly, a review of existing work on the topic will be given. Derived hypotheses will be tested using survey data from the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> wave of the WVS, thereby applying multi-level-analysis techniques. In a last step, a counterfactual analysis will be conducted to determine in which regard social inequality can explain the US' outlying position in regard to individual levels of individual religiosity and religious leadership preferences.

## THE CAUSES OF SECULARIZATION

The classical secularization framework states that societal modernization erodes religion's significance by processes operating on at least three different levels: the societal, the organizational and the individual level (cf. Dobbelaere 2002). The main forces that facilitate the secularization process have been theorized to be functional differentiation and specialization of the sub-spheres of society. On a macro-level, religion is thought to be fused together with the other subsystems in traditional societies, thereby fulfilling functions such as political legitimization as well as provision of education and welfare (the famous "Sacred Canopy"; cf. Berger 1969). In the course of modernization religion gets separated from all these subsystems and becomes more and more incompatible to the imperatives that drive politics, rationalized economy and science (cf. Weber 2006b). The pluralisation of 'lifeworlds' leads to differing religious worldviews, which make the persistence of one single legitimizing religious worldview impossible to maintain, the "plausibility structure" of religion becomes severely undermined (cf. Berger & Luckmann 1966). A relativization of religious beliefs and decrease of societal importance of religion takes place. With religion's separation from other parts of the society and the increased demand for scientific and technical knowledge, it becomes increasingly difficult to socialize younger cohorts into traditional belief systems. Yet with the loss of its former all-embracing functions for society, religion is forced to retreat from the public into the private sphere, losing its influence and significance for other parts of the society. On an individual level, decreasing individual religious beliefs and a disengagement from religious rites follow. Finally, individuals stop evaluating large parts of society or their lives in a religious fashion. Dobbelaere has coined the term *secularization-in-mind* (also: *compartmentalization*) for this: "Do people think in terms of the separation of religion and the juridical, educational, the economic, the family, the scientific, the medical, and the political systems?" (Dobbelaere 2002: 169). The present paper tries to answer this question in regard to attitudes towards the relationship between religion and politics.

## SECULARIZATION AND "EXISTENTIAL SECULARISM"

Norris and Inglehart's approach to secularization puts the socio-economic development of societies into the centre of attention. The demand for religious (or authoritarian) value systems is determined by the levels of experienced "existential security" in the re-

spondents' formative years or current life situation: "Individuals experiencing stress have the need for rigid, predictable rules" (Norris & Inglehart 2004: 19). Thus societies that cannot provide their citizens with a minimal level of existential security are also societies where the demand for religious values seems to be highest. Individuals use religious values and belief-systems as a mean to cope with fear and uncertainty: "This belief [religious belief, TM] reduces stress, enabling people to shut out anxiety and focus on coping with their immediate problems" (ibid.). The study conducted by the authors seems to validate the claim that secularization takes place when the general living conditions improve. They find a wide array of evidence for the secularizing effects of improved living conditions on several indicators (religious beliefs, behaviours and related attitudes) they examine. While Norris & Inglehart propose psychological reasons to explain why people develop a higher demand for religious values and religious leaders in politics, other explanations can be given as well. Recent work in the field of Political Economy has pointed out that being religious can be worthwhile even if the main gain is not spiritual (or psychological) but monetary. Huber and Stanig (2007) have developed a theoretical model that shows that the religious poor and the richer strata of society can have monetary incentives to make sure that welfare spending is allocated via religious channels so that the secular poor are excluded from further welfare gains.<sup>1</sup> Gill and Lunds-gaarde (2004) find that welfare spending reduces religiosity, because religious groups become less important as welfare providers. Davis and Robinson (2007) find – at least in Muslim societies - that poorer strata of society prefer religious value systems because they are often egalitarian and promote the redistribution of incomes. Glaeser et al. (2005) show that there can also be other strategic incentives for parties to polarize along religious lines.

## THE RC PARADIGM

The Rational-Choice framework of sociology of religion constitutes the main rivalling theory towards classical and newer secularization approaches. It has been developed in the 1980ies by Stark and Bainbridge (1980) to give an answer on the outlying case of the US.<sup>2</sup> In this framework, it is assumed that religion constitutes a good which is "traded" in religious markets. The demand for religious goods is stable – every person inherently longs for an afterlife. Thus the variance in religious vitality must be generated from different supplies of religious goods that consumers can choose from. Competitive religious markets (with many producers and low state intervention) are therefore hypothesized to be benevolent for the quality of the religious goods offered, because religious actors have to put stronger efforts into their work to survive. On the opposite,

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<sup>1</sup> Some authors suggest that religiosity can be a psychological compensator, as religious persons tend to have lower preferences for social insurance (cf. Scheve & Stasavage 2006).

<sup>2</sup> The paradigm has been extended and further elaborated by several other authors (cf. Stark & Bainbridge 1987; Iannacone 1991; Iannacone 1998)

highly regulated markets or such markets, that are marked by a religious monopoly (i.e. state religions), will lead to goods with inferior quality, as religious suppliers have no incentive to improve their efforts. Thus consumers' demands are not met, decreased religious activity and decreasing membership levels follow. How should the preferences regarding the role of religious leaders in politics be affected by this? Martin (1978) has hypothesized that in such high-plurality situations, political demands can easily be articulated in religious terms, because "every political demand finds the proper religious mask". Halman and Petersson make a similar argument (cf. Halman & Petersson 2004).

## CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Several other approaches have been brought forward to explain different secularization outcomes, regarding individual religiosity as well as the preferences for the relationship between religion and politics. Probably the best-known (and most often debated) explanation of cultural differences is given with Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis, which states that religion will be one of the main sources of future conflicts between states (cf. Huntington 1996). Also Norris and Inglehart (2004) and classical secularization theorists (cf. Bruce 2002) emphasize the importance of cultural factors. Religion can fulfil many different functions other than "connecting individuals to the supernatural" (cf. Bruce 2002). It can serve as a vehicle to express social or political grievances (cf. Martin 1978), act as a mean to protect group identity against certain external threats (*cultural defence*), or can be used as a special form of cultural capital to facilitate the transfer into guest societies after a migration process (*cultural transition*, cf. Bruce 2002). Research shows that many of the claims made by Huntington to be wrong. Muslims are just as favourable towards democratic values than persons from Western societies (Norris & Inglehart 2004), and Muslim societies do not have as "bloody borders" as had been claimed (cf. Fox 2004). Yet we also know that huge differences between Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim societies exist regarding levels of religiosity and, more important, regarding moral values (cf. Norris & Inglehart 2003). Clearly, cultural factors and differing religious value systems have to be taken into account when analysing the attitudes towards the relationship between religion and politics. The present analysis will therefore pay attention to the differences that possibly exist between different religious denominations, although this is not its main goal. A similar study that focuses on this differences has been undertaken by Carlson and Listhaug (2006).

## PREVIOUS FINDINGS

There are several recent studies which have tested the validity of secularization theories and the RC-Framework, as well as the role that cultural differences play in regard to individual levels of religiosity and attitudes towards religious leaders in religion and politics. Halman and Draulans (2006) can validate some hypotheses of the classical seculariza-

tion paradigm. Looking at individual religiosity in Europe, they do not find an overall significant effect of economic development. However, they can show that the degree of globalization of a society shows a negative relationship with individual religiosity. Moreover they report a negative effect of religious pluralism, which is contradicting the RC-framework. Regarding cultural effects, the authors find that Catholic and Orthodox societies as well as individuals show higher levels of religiosity, even after controlling for other relevant factors.

In their analysis of religiosity in a worldwide sample of countries Höllinger et al. (2007) report no significant effect of societal modernization on religiosity. But similar to Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004) the authors report a negative effect of welfare spending. Moreover, they find important effects of historical and organizational features of the religious systems in the examined countries, showing that national popular religions and denominational types of religious regimes exert a stronger influence than is observed in countries with state religions.

Apart from Norris and Inglehart (2004), who find strong evidence for their existential-security-hypothesis, several other authors have examined the attitudes that people hold regarding the role of religious leaders in politics. In their analysis of 1999/2000 EVS and WVS data Halman and Petersson (2004) find hardly any effect of GDP per capita on attitudes. But, more in line with the RC-Paradigm, positive effects of religious and political pluralism on the acceptance of religious leaders in politics are found. Moreover, individual "civic attitudes" show a negative effect on the acceptance of religious leaders, but this effect is decreased under conditions of high pluralism. Societal levels of secularization exert a strong negative influence.

Carlson & Listhaug (2006) find a negative modernization effect, yet only for one of two attitude dimensions in question. The level of democratization in a country has no effect, but higher ethnic fractionalization is shown to foster the acceptance of religious leaders in politics. On an individual level, younger age, higher education and income levels exert negative effects, individual religiosity strong positive effects. Somewhat unexpected, the authors find that Catholic respondents are more inclined to speak against a stronger role of religious leaders in politics, whereas Muslim respondents are more in favour of this. Nonetheless, the authors report that higher education decreases these attitudes for members of all denominations, clearly showing that Muslims are not immune against the effects of secularization.

## **HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND MEASUREMENT**

The data to be used in this paper comes from the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> wave of the World Values/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS) and has been collected between 1995 and 2002. In total, three different indicators of individual secularization are to be examined: individual religiosity, attitudes towards the role of religious leaders in the political sphere ("Religious Leadership") and attitudes towards the influence that religious leaders can exert on the political process ("Religious Influence"). By examining all three dimensions

it becomes possible to compare the different effects that contextual and individual-level variables exert on the constructs. Moreover questions of how individual religiosity is transformed into support for religious leaders shall be answered. The roles of "existential security" and social inequality deserve special attention. One particular question that arises is, whether conditions of insecurity reinforce the effect of religiosity on religious leadership attitudes or vice versa. Religiosity might play a lesser role in shaping religious leadership attitudes in higher developed societies, because religion is rendered more and more a private matter. I will now present the dependent and independent variables that will be part of the examination and derive respective hypotheses, which are based on the theoretical considerations laid out before.

### **Dependent Variables**

The first construct under consideration is individual religiosity. The effects which we observe here can serve as a baseline for how well the suggested theoretical frameworks also explain religious leadership and religious influence attitudes. Religiosity is measured by the variable "Importance of God in respondent's life". Although there might be many other ways to assess respondents' religiosity, this variable is considered to capture very well a subjective/private character of religiosity. More "traditional" measures of religiosity, i.e. the frequency of church-attendance, can be problematic in a comparative context, which mixes data from a large variety of different cultural backgrounds. The importance of publicly expressed religiosity is evaluated differently for example in Christian and Muslim societies (cf. Moaddel 2007). As the study is confined to countries with predominantly monotheistic religious cultures, no special interpretation issues should arise concerning the concept of "God". The exact question wording is as follows: "How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate – 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important." This variable will also serve as an independent variable for the analysis of the other attitude items.

In order to assess respondents' attitudes towards the role and influence of religious leaders in politics, I will analyze items which have been widely used in previous research (cf. Halman & Petersson 2004; Norris & Inglehart 2004; Carlson & Listhaug 2006). In the WVS respondents are questioned four different items to assess the relationship that they deem appropriate between religion and politics. These are:

- a. "Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office."
- b. "Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections."
- c. "It would be better for this country, if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office."
- d. "Religious leaders should not influence government decisions."

Respondents could indicate their preferences on a scale from 1 ("Agree strongly") to 5 ("Strongly disagree"). In fact, these items tap into different dimensions of the relationship between religious leaders and the political sphere. While items a and c ask about the (religious) criteria for the selection of politicians, items b and d ask about

the influence that religious leaders should exert on the political process (cf. Carlson & Listhaug 2006). Another interpretation would also be possible: the two first mentioned items represent attitudes towards a *legitimate* representation of religious interests, whereas the last two items represent a more *illegitimate* form of exerting influence in the political sphere. In order to reduce complexity and validate the claim of two different dimensions, a factor-analysis<sup>3</sup> has been undertaken (results not shown). Clearly the two hypothesized dimensions emerge, so that two different indices have been constructed by averaging the respondent's answers for the respective items. The first index (items a and c) yields a reliability of Cronbach's  $\alpha=0.71$  and will be referred to as "Religious Leadership Index". The second index has a reliability of  $\alpha=0.67$  and will be referred to as "Religious Influence Index". Item-scores have been reversed so that higher scores on each index indicate attitudes in favour of religious leadership and influence.

### Independent Macro-Level Variables

According to classical secularization accounts, modernization, more precise functional differentiation, is expected to have negative effects on individual religiosity and should also decrease the preferences for religious leaders in politics. The construct will be measured by the *Human Development Index* (HDI), a compound indicator that takes into account societies' economic development (GDP per capita), education and literacy levels, and life expectancy (cf. United Nations Development Program 2000). The HDI ranges from 0 to 1, whereby 1 indicates the highest level of human development. Countries are assigned the HDI value from 1998 as it is reported in the Human Development Report 2000 (ibid.).

The second contextual variable taken into account is the level of income inequality in a country as measured by the *Gini-Index*. Scores range from 0 (absolute equality) to 1 (absolute inequality). This variable is intended to give a more accurate measure of "existential security" in a country. Although the HDI could be considered to capture this dimension, it neglects the fact that welfare can be spread unequally in a society. Unfortunately, the Gini-Index is not as widely available as the HDI, so that country measurements have to be taken from different years. The data source is the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database (cf. World Bank 2007). Higher levels of income inequality are considered to create higher levels of insecurity for the individuals in a country; therefore higher inequality should show positive effects on individual religiosity and preferences for religious leaders in politics (cf. Norris & Inglehart 2004). As laid out above, individuals in higher-inequality societies can have a rationale to use religious doctrines to increase their welfare gains from religious providers or state benefits that are distributed via religious channels (cf. Gill & Lundsgaarde 2004; Huber & Stanig 2007).

The classical secularization framework / theory of plausibility structures (cf. Berger & Luckmann 1966; Berger 1969) hypothesizes stronger connections between relig-

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<sup>3</sup> Principal Component Factor Analysis (PCF), Varimax rotation.

ion and other spheres of society (especially politics and education) to be helpful in keeping up religious identities and a more integrated view of religion and other parts of the society (cf. Dobbelaere 2002). However, one can argue that a general measure of modernization, such as the HDI, does not really capture the interrelatedness between religion and other spheres of society. Therefore I will use a more direct measurement, namely *the number of religious laws* that exist in each society. The data stems from Fox's *Religion and the State Project* (cf. Fox 2006).<sup>4</sup> No special weights are given for specific law domains, thus every law, be it dietary laws, restrictions on public dress or blasphemy laws are counted as one additional point. From a theoretical point of view, the RC-Paradigm would interpret a high number of religious laws in a country as a regulation of the religious market and therefore expect negative effects on individual religiosity and attitudes towards religious leadership.

Another crucial variable to assess the validity of the RC-Framework is the level of *religious pluralism* that exists in a society. According to the RC-Framework, higher religious pluralism should foster competition on the religious market and religious vitality should increase. Similarly, higher religious pluralism could facilitate the expression of political or social grievances in a religious manner, because a more pluralized religious landscape would be more adaptable to the different interests that need to find expression (cf. Martin 1978; Halman & Petersson 2004). According to the theory of plausibility structures, higher religious pluralism should undermine the credibility of each single religious worldview, because no single view can claim absolute truth anymore, whereby religion is forced into the private sphere. In this study religious pluralism will be measured by the *Herfindahl-Index* of religious fractionalization. It represents the "market share" of different religious denominations in a given area. The use of the Herfindahl-Index has been strongly criticized, because a lot of correlations that have been found between the index and church-attendance rates have shown to be statistical artefacts (cf. Voas, Crockett & Olson 2002). This study is not concerned with the effects on church-attendance and the Herfindahl-Index is also not calculated directly from the dataset, so that there should be no immediate concern regarding this study. Nonetheless the reader is urged to interpret the findings in regard to this variable with caution. However religious pluralism is not the only indicator used to test the RC-hypotheses (see the extent of religious laws above). The Herfindahl-Index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher levels of religious pluralism. Data has been taken from Alesina et al. (2003).

As an additional control-variable on the macro-level the level of democratization in a country will be included. The indicator used is a merged score of political rights and civil liberties from the *Freedom House* (cf. Freedom House 2008). The scale ranges from 1 to 7, and has been reversed, so that 7 represents the highest level of democratization.

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<sup>4</sup> A list of the religious laws that have been taken into account for this variable can be found in the appendix, further documentation under:  
<http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/Religion%20and%20State%20Codebook.pdf>.

## Independent Micro-Level Variables

Several individual-level variables should affect individual religiosity as well as attitudes towards religious leaders in politics. First of all, higher *education* levels are expected to show a negative correlation with all three constructs. Respondents' education is measured as a simplified variable, which has been constructed from the country-specific education levels. It measures the highest education level attained, distinguishing between "lower education", "middle education" and "higher education". The variable is taken directly from the survey data with no other recoding made.

Higher *income* levels should have a negative effect on religiosity and preferences for the involvement/influence of religious leaders in politics, as they increase the individual levels of existential security. Respondents were asked to indicate, which scale of household income they would themselves ascribe to. The categories were constructed after the income deciles in each country. A score of 1 means, the respondent reported himself to be in the lowest decile, a score of 10 represents the highest decile.

In order to assess cultural effects of different religious belief-systems, respondent's self reported religious denomination was taken into account. The answers given were recoded into a simplified scheme<sup>5</sup>: Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Orthodox, other, none. For the multivariate analysis the information was included as dummy variables.

For the analysis of the two attitude dimensions *Religious Leadership* and *Religious Influence*, individual religiosity (Importance of God) was included as a control variable. Previous research has shown that the strongest effect of all individual level variables is exerted by this variable (cf. Halman & Petersson 2004; Carlson & Listhaug 2006). In addition, interaction-terms of religiosity and HDI have been constructed to assess if higher levels of socio-economic development have an ameliorating effect for the transformation of individual religiosity into the two attitude dimensions. Finally, respondents' *gender* and *age* will be included as control-variables, with higher age expected to show a positive effect on religiosity and preferences for religion's role in politics.

## BIVARIATE ANALYSIS

To get a first impression of how well the suggested constructs explain individual religiosity and attitudes towards the relationship between religion and politics, some simple correlation analyses seem to be helpful.<sup>6</sup> *Table 1* shows the correlations between the macro-level-indicators and the country-means of the dependent variables. Firstly, some interesting relationships between the explanatory variables themselves show up. We observe that higher developed countries, more democratized societies and countries with

<sup>5</sup> Detailed information about the recoding of each denomination can be obtained upon request.

<sup>6</sup> Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables as well as a list of countries which are included in the different steps of the analysis can be found in the appendix.

higher degrees of religious pluralism have a lower extensity of religious laws, which seems to be consistent with the classical secularization framework. Regarding the levels of religiosity (Importance of God), we find that these are lower in countries with higher development and democratization levels, and also in countries that have lower levels of income inequality. The correlation coefficients for these effects are consistently high ( $>.60$ ) and support the hypotheses which have been derived from traditional secularization theories and Norris and Inglehart's framework of existential security. The same relationships show up for the preferences for religious leadership/influence, albeit to a lesser extent. The level to which people tolerate or prefer the influence of religious leaders on politics cannot be predicted as well as the extent to which people prefer a stronger presence of religious leaders in politics by the explanatory variables.

**Table 1.** Correlation of macro-level variables and country-means of dependent variables.

	HDI	Gini	Democr.	Rel. Plu- ral.	Rel. Laws	Imp. of God	Rel. Lead.	Rel. Infl.
HDI	1.00							
Gini-Index	-0.37*	1.00						
Democratization	0.73*	-0.28*	1.00					
Rel. Pluralism	-0.01	-0.01	0.10	1.00				
Rel. Laws	-0.23*	-0.14	-0.42*	-0.46*	1.00			
Importance of God	-0.67*	0.60*	-0.60*	-0.28*	0.28*	1.00		
Religious Leader- ship	-0.77*	0.48*	-0.71*	-0.10	0.43*	0.85*	1.00	
Religious Influence	-0.30*	0.49*	-0.33*	0.12	0.19	0.40*	0.37*	1.00

N=56; \*  $p < 0.05$

All the correlations are much lower in this case, with income inequality being one of the better predictors ( $r=.49$ ). The predictions of the RC-Framework are not validated at this point. Religious pluralism does neither show the expected positive relationship, neither with religiosity nor the Religious-Leadership-Index. Instead we find a negative relationship ( $r=-.28$ ) for levels of religiosity and only a weak positive relationship regarding religious influence. These findings are more consistent with traditional secularization theory, which predicts a secularizing effect of religious pluralism. The effect of religious laws in a country supports this argument: The more religious laws in a society exist, the higher are the levels of individual religiosity and preferences for religious leaders in politics. Thus stronger plausibility structures seem to have a positive effect, not a negative effect (via regulation of religious markets) as predicted by the RC-Paradigm. This does not seem to hold for the religious-influence-dimension, for which the results are not as clear cut. Firstly, there exists only a moderate relationship between individual religiosity and preferences for the influence of religious leaders ( $r=.40$ ,  $r=.85$  for Religious Leadership), secondly, societies which show higher levels for the presence of religious leaders in poli-

tics do not seem to strongly approve the influence of religious leaders on government decisions or government decisions ( $r=.37$ ).

Figures 1 to 3 show the variance that exists between the countries in regard to religiosity-levels and the preferences regarding the relationship between religion and politics. The scatterplots depict the relationship between modernization levels and the dependent variables and also contain information about the countries' predominant religious culture<sup>7</sup> and if a country belonged to the former Socialist societies. It can be seen that a negative relationship between modernization and all three dependent variables exists. But we can find interesting outliers. In regard to religiosity levels, the Muslim as well as the Latin-American societies lie clearly above the levels, which would be expected from their degrees of modernization alone. Former Socialist societies generally show lower levels of religiosity, presumably because of strong forced secularization policies during the Soviet era. Exceptions are given with Romania and Poland, with relatively high levels of religiosity. The USA are the most prominent outlier among the highly developed societies, with a level of religiosity as high as (or even higher) that of Catholic societies.

This also holds for levels of preferences for religious leadership (Figure 2). The US also stand out among the developed societies in this respect. If this observation can be explained with high levels of social inequality, as has been suggested by Norris and Inglehart (2004), remains to be seen. Again, we find that respondents in Muslim societies show preferences for religious leadership that are well above the mean, however some exceptions exist in this regard: Bangladesh and Pakistan display only low or moderate levels. Interestingly, not all societies with remarkably high religiosity levels also possess high preferences for the representation of religious interests in politics (i.e. Poland or Portugal). This might be interpreted as an example for different dimensions of secularization: religiosity is widely accepted in the private sphere, but slowly driven out of the public (political) sphere.

Figure 3 might validate this claim in some respect. The relationship between modernization levels and attitudes towards the influence of religious leaders on politics is not as marked as before. We can also see that a stronger influence is rejected in most of the countries, regardless of their level of development. Respondents in Muslim societies are somewhat more favourable towards this idea, as well as US-respondents. But the US are not as dissimilar here than in regard to religiosity and attitudes towards religious leadership.

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<sup>7</sup> Cultural groups were constructed according to Norris & Inglehart (2004) and Huntington (1996), with some modifications. Latin-American societies are regarded as distinct cultural group, although they are predominantly Catholic, for the reasoning behind this see Höllinger et al. (2007) and Martin (2005).

Figure 1: Relationship between modernization level (HDI) and Importance of God (country means); symbols indicate predominant religious culture; regression-line obtained via simple OLS.




Figure 2. Relationship between modernization level (HDI) and Religious Leadership Index (country means); symbols indicate predominant religious culture; regression-line obtained via simple OLS.





Figure 3. Relationship between modernization level (HDI) and Religious Influence Index (country means); symbols indicate predominant religious culture; regression-line obtained via simple OLS.



## MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

A clearer picture of the determinants that underlie individual religiosity and the attitudes towards the role of religious leaders in politics can be drawn after the multivariate analysis of the data. Due to the nested structure of the data (respondents are nested in countries), I will conduct a multilevel-regression, which makes a decomposition of unexplained variances on the micro- as well as on the macro-level possible. Moreover, contextual effects (of country characteristics) can be taken into account. Two different types of models have been calculated. Firstly, simple models, which only take into account the main effects of the explanatory variables (*Table 2*). Secondly, models that include respective cross-level-interactions in order to determine how the relationship between individual religiosity and preferences for religious leaders in politics is influenced by modernization and inequality-levels (*Table 3*). To facilitate interpretation, all explanatory variables, except the dummy-variables, have been centred around the grand mean.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Thus the constant in each model can be interpreted as the score for a middle-aged Protestant male, with average income and education in an average non-ex-Socialist society.

How well do the secularization-framework, the existential-security-approach and the RC-explanations work in regard to the individual "Importance of God"? We find that most results we already could observe during the bivariate analysis are confirmed. Individuals in countries with higher modernization levels, respectively higher levels of "existential security", are less religious. This is confirmed by the negative HDI-effect (-4.91), as well as by the positive effect for income inequality (7.60)<sup>9</sup>. The effects for HDI and the Gini-Index exert the strongest influence among all the contextual variables, which is revealed through the standardized regression-coefficients ("beta")<sup>10</sup>. Against the expectations of the RC-Framework, we find a *negative* effect of religious pluralism on religiosity, which is in line with the theory of plausibility structures.

However, no significant positive effect for religious laws is found, which we would have expected from this theory. Higher democratization-scores are negatively related to individual religiosity. Surprisingly, persons in ex-Socialist societies do not show a significant lower level of religiosity, probably due to the fact that we control for religious denominations (and thus also for non-belonging).

To which direction do the effects of the micro-level variables point? We see that younger as well as higher educated persons are less religious and that higher income has a negative effect on religiosity, thereby validating secularization accounts. Moreover, women are more likely to regard God as important in their lives as men. Regarding the different denominations, we find that respondents in the "other" category as well as Muslim respondents show the highest levels of religiosity, followed by Catholics and Orthodox, with Protestants being the least religious. Not surprisingly, persons that indicate no religious denomination are also the least religious.

How well do the explanatory variables fare in the case of the preferences for religious leaders in politics? The models for the Religious-Leadership-Index and the Religious-Influence-Index have both been calculated including "Importance of God" as an explanatory variable, whereby it is assumed that this effect may vary across countries. Thus a random slope has been included. In fact, the explanatory variables which are deemed to be important by the classical secularization theory and Norris and Inglehart's framework of existential security have a significant explanatory power in regard to religious leadership. Again we find that the level of Human Development and income inequality show the expected signs and exert the strongest effects. Moreover, the societal level of secularization, represented by the amount of religious laws, is an important explanatory factor for the preferences that persons hold regarding religious leaders in politics. In line with the theory of plausibility structures and Dobbelaere's accounts on "secularization-in-mind", the stronger the relationship between religion and the state, the stronger people regard this relationship to be appropriate. The effect is even

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<sup>9</sup> Because the HDI and the Gini-Index have a range from 0 to 1, the unstandardized coefficients indicates the difference between those to extremes.

<sup>10</sup> The standardized coefficients show by how many standard deviations the dependent variable increases if the explanatory variable is increased by 1 sd (cf. Snijders & Bosker 1999).

stronger than the effect of income inequality and might help to explain the outlying position of Muslim societies, which generally show a high density of religious laws.<sup>11</sup>

*Table 2.* Multilevel regression of macro- and micro-level variables on individual religiosity, attitudes towards Religious Leadership and Religious Influence.<sup>12</sup>

	Importance of God			Religious Leadership			Religious Influence		
	Coeff.	beta	Sign.	Coeff.	beta	Sign.	Coeff.	beta	Sign.
<b>Macro-Level</b>									
HDI	-4.919	-0.207	***	-1.769	-0.204	***	0.079	0.011	
Gini-Index	7.595	0.211	***	2.139	0.151	**	1.079	0.093	*
Religious Laws	-0.017	-0.031		0.035	0.156	**	0.003	0.016	
Rel. Pluralism	-1.460	-0.116	**	0.179	0.036		0.236	0.058	
Democratization	-0.241	-0.127	*	-0.049	-0.065		0.011	0.017	
Ex-Socialist Society	-0.520	-0.076		0.252	0.093	*	-0.026	-0.012	
<b>Micro-Level</b>									
Income	-0.052	-0.041	***	-0.021	-0.042	***	-0.001	-0.001	
Education	-0.118	-0.028	***	-0.096	-0.058	***	-0.025	-0.019	***
Age	0.011	0.060	***	0.003	0.041	***	0.000	-0.007	+
Female	0.522	0.084	***	0.013	0.005	+	0.011	0.005	
Rel. Denomination (Ref.: Protestant)									
Catholic	0.286	0.042	***	-0.121	-0.045	***	-0.018	-0.008	
Muslim	0.329	0.045	***	0.016	0.006		-0.005	-0.002	
Orthodox	0.191	0.017	***	-0.129	-0.029	***	-0.103	-0.028	***
other	0.589	0.036	***	-0.017	-0.003		-0.047	-0.009	*
none	-2.468	-0.302	***	-0.283	-0.091	***	-0.121	-0.048	***
Imp. God				0.123	0.315	***	0.045	0.142	***
Constant	7.714		***	3.100		***	2.244		***
Level-2-Variance		0.857			0.106			0.050	
Level-1-Variance		4.918			0.805			0.938	
Var. Random Slope									
Imp. God					0.002			0.002	
R1 <sup>2</sup>		0.42			0.38			0.03	
R2 <sup>2</sup>		0.78			0.78			0.15	
ICC		0.148			0.116			0.051	
N Individ./Countries		82298/68			63548/55			63055/55	
log likelihood		-182528.34			-83537.35			-87646.22	

+ p<.10; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

<sup>11</sup> Results not reported here.

The effect of religious pluralism points into the direction predicted by RC-theories. It is positive but lacks statistical significance. However, a significant positive effect had been found before in other studies (cf. Halman & Petersson 2004; Carlson & Listhaug 2006). Democratization exerts a negative effect, and paradoxically, respondents in the ex-Socialist societies express stronger preferences for religious leaders, despite the impact that forced secularization should have had here. It is possible that nationalistic or ethno-religious conflicts (i.e. the Balkan War) have left their imprints through a mobilization along religious lines, at the same time leaving individual religiosity more or less untouched.

The effects for the individual-level resemble the effects that could be observed in regard to religiosity, whereby the Importance of God exerts the strongest effect on preferences for religious leaders in politics. Especially interesting are the effects of individuals' religious denomination. They differ remarkably from the former model. We found all other denominations to be more religious than Protestants. Yet here we observe that, apart from Muslims, who do not differ significantly, all other denominations are *less* likely to prefer religious leaders in politics. These results are also different from Carlson and Listhaug's (2006) findings, which reported only Catholics to be less in favour of a stronger relationship between religion and politics and Muslims to be more in favour than Protestants.

It seems that the attitudes towards the influence that religious leaders should have on the political system cannot be explained to the same extent by the theoretical frameworks laid out before. Regarding the effects of the contextual variables, only the Gini-coefficient shows a significant positive effect. This confirms the claims made by Norris and Inglehart: higher social inequality makes the influence of religious leaders on politics more acceptable. But the effect is not as strong as in the other models. A higher development or democratization level as well as living in one of the ex-Socialist countries does not influence respondents' perception towards religious influence.

The explanatory power of the micro-level-variables is also only very low. Income and gender do not play a role, only higher education shows the expected negative (albeit weak) effect. Unexpectedly, the coefficient for age shows a negative sign, meaning that younger persons seem to be more in favour of the influence of religious leaders. It might be possible that younger and older respondents interpret this influence in different ways, and that the influence that religious leaders exert on politics nowadays is not as strict or conservative as it used to be. Individual religiosity shows the expected positive effect, but has less predictive power than in regard to attitudes towards religious leadership (a beta of .14 compared to .32).

Once more we can observe that members of all other denominations are *less* likely to be in favour of the influence of religious leaders than Protestants, which raises

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<sup>12</sup> *Note:*  $R1^2$  and  $R2^2$  indicate the amount of variance explained at the individual ( $R1^2$ ) and the macro-level ( $R2^2$ ) in comparison to an empty model. Calculations are based on Snijders and Boskers (1999). The intraclass correlations (ICC) for the empty models are 0.39, 0.33 and 0.06.

serious doubts of Huntington's clash of civilization thesis.<sup>13</sup> The overall explanatory power of the model is very low, only 3% of variance between individuals and 15% of variance between countries is explained. The low figures might be explainable by the fact that the variance of this dependent variable is not very large – the (illegitimate) influence of religious leaders is widely rejected.<sup>14</sup>

Another interesting question arises concerning how individual religiosity is transformed into preferences for religious leaders' representation or influence. It is reasonable to assume that persons in developed countries or countries with lower levels of insecurity (lower income inequality) develop a more privatized view on the role of religion. They view religiosity as appropriate for themselves or their private lives but do not ascribe a wider role to religion for the society itself. Religion becomes "compartmentalized" (cf. Dobbelaere 2002). Religious persons in modernized countries should have weaker preferences for religious leaders in politics than religious persons in less modernized countries. Expressed in technical terms, we should observe a *negative* interaction-effect between the importance of God and HDI and a *positive* interaction-effect for religiosity and the Gini-Index. Two models for each attitude dimension have been calculated to test these claims. The results are shown in *Table 3*.

Surprisingly, we find exactly the opposite effects. The effect of individual religiosity on both attitude dimensions is indeed *reinforced* in countries with higher Human Development levels. The same holds for the cross-level-interaction between religiosity and income inequality. The *negative* sign means that more religious persons are more in favour of a stronger relation between religion and politics in countries with lower levels of income inequality. *Figure 4* helps to solve this paradox. It depicts a conditional-effect-plot of the relationship between importance of God and the Religious-Leadership-Index for low HDI countries (HDI set to the sample minimum of .409) and high HDI countries (HDI = .935). Religious persons in high HDI countries indeed show weaker preferences for the role of religious leaders in politics. The values for high HDI countries lie consistently below the values for less developed societies. However, the regression line for the high HDI countries is much steeper, which explains why we observe a *positive* interaction-effect. The effect of religiosity is quite small in low HDI countries – even weakly religious persons express considerably high preferences for religious leaders. Thus with a bit of caution we might conclude that it is not the religious persons who develop more "compartmentalized" attitudes during the modernization process, but it is the less religious persons who seem to change their preferences towards a more private role of religion.

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<sup>13</sup> Albeit the effects only reach statistical significance for Orthodox and "other" denominations and non-denominational respondents.


<sup>14</sup> Carlson & Listhaug (2006) note that the overall low acceptance of religious leaders' influence might be an artefact of question wording ("Religious leaders should not influence people's vote/government decisions").

Table 3. Cross-level-interactions between development-levels, income inequality and Importance of God<sup>15</sup>.

	Religious Leadership			Religious Influence		
	Coeff.	Beta	Sign.	Coeff.	beta	Sign.
Imp. God	0.118	0.302	***	0.117	0.301	***
HDI X Imp. God	0.202	0.059	***	0.123	0.044	***
Imp. God	0.042	0.130	***	0.042	0.130	***
Gini X Imp. God	-0.188	-0.040	*	-0.128	-0.033	*

\* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

Figure 4. Effect of "Importance of God" in low (.409) and high (.935) HDI countries. Values are calculated from the models in Table 3, all other explanatory variables are set to their mean.



**CAN US-EXCEPTIONALISM BE EXPLAINED BY HIGHER LEVELS OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY?**

We have seen that the USA have an outlying position in several respects: strong religiosity, strong preferences for the representation of religious interests in the political sphere and relatively high agreement regarding the influential role of religious leaders in politics

<sup>15</sup> All other explanatory variables have also been included in the models. For the sake of brevity, the results are not reported here but can be requested from the author.

– all despite a high modernization level, a strict separation of religion and state, a long democratic tradition and a highly pluralized religious landscape. The proponents of the RC-Framework of sociology of religion just deem these factors to be explanatory for the high levels of religious vitality. However the bivariate and multivariate analyses have shown that just these factors are actually weakening individual religiosity and preferences for a stronger connection between religion and politics. So how can US-Exceptionalism be explained?

Martin (1978) argues from a historical perspective and points out that, in contrast to European societies, Enlightenment, revolution and religion were aligned in the US (and laid the base for the modern “civil religion”). Yet in Europe, religion and the “ancient regime” formed a coalition that led to the development of an anticlerical Enlightenment movement that was the main drive behind the secularization process. Bruce (2006) sees federal structures (that allow for strong religious sub-cultures) and the identity conserving role of religion for immigrant communities as the main reasons for the US-Exceptionalism. Norris and Inglehart (2004) come up with a relatively parsimonious (but not their only) explanation for the US’ outlying position: “[T]he United States is exceptionally high in religiosity in large part [...] because it is also one of the most unequal postindustrial societies under comparison. Relatively high levels of economic insecurity are experienced by many sectors of U.S. society...” (Norris & Inglehart 2004: 107-108).


We have found that economic inequality indeed exerts strong positive effects on the preferences for religious leaders in politics. Then how important is the role of inequality for the high acceptance of religiously inspired in politics in the US? To answer this question, a little “thought experiment” shall be conducted: How strongly would attitudes towards religious leadership change, if the US (Gini-Index: .41) reduced their income inequality to the level of Sweden (Gini-Index: .25)? We can conduct this counterfactual analysis by using the regression equation of the model for “Religious Leadership” from *Table 2* to calculate this prediction.<sup>16</sup> Thereby all other explanatory variables are set to the respective mean values for the US, only letting the value for the Gini-Index vary. The results are shown in *Figure 5*.

The first bar shows the actually observed score for the Religious-Leadership-Index in the US (3.26). The second bar shows the score, which is predicted from the regression model, if all the explanatory variables are set to the US-level. A score of 3.25 tells us that the model prediction is quite accurate. The third bar gives the predicted value if the US-Gini would be set to .25, all other conditions equal. The average preference for religious leaders in politics would be quite significantly reduced to a score of 2.91. To make this result more comparable, the mean score for postindustrial societies (HDI  $\geq$  .90), which is 2.29, is added as a horizontal line. However, it can be seen that a value of 2.91 lays still way above this level. Thus a second step in this thought-experiment seems to be reasonable. A reduction of income inequality in this magnitude

<sup>16</sup> Of course, this exercise is not meant to replicate the real causal processes. But it may be a helpful visualization of results.

would also reduce the level of religiosity in the US – from 8.53 points (actually observed) to 7.41 points, according to the “Importance of God” model in *Table 2*. Thus if we allow the general level to be reduced as well and plug in a score of 7.41, we would observe a reduction of preferences for religious leadership to 2.72 points (fourth bar in *Figure 5*).

*Figure 5.* Observed and predicted values for the dependent variable “Religious Leadership” after a hypothetical change of income inequality in the US.



And indeed, the outlying position of the US in this respect would be remarkably reduced. However, the US would still lie well above the mean score of 2.29 for postindustrial societies – despite the fact that we reduced the income inequality by this large amount (ca. 2 standard deviations). We may conclude that Norris and Inglehart are right in pointing out the role that economic insecurity plays for higher levels of religiosity and related attitudes in the US. But we must add that this is not the whole story behind the observed US-Exceptionalism. Many other factors must be taken into account to explain this phenomenon.

## CONCLUSION

The present study tried to explain individual levels of religiosity and the attitudes that large populations all over the world hold towards the relationship between religion and politics. For this purpose survey data from 55 countries has been analyzed, thereby tak-

ing into account a wide array of contextual and individual explanatory variables. Hypotheses derived from classical secularization theory (cf. Berger 1969; Bruce 2002; Dobbelaere 2002), the existential security framework (cf. Norris & Inglehart 2004), the RC-Paradigm of sociology of religion (cf. Stark & Bainbridge 1980) as well as cultural explanations (cf. Huntington 1996) were put to an empirical test. It was found that many claims that are made by secularization approaches are not only able to explain individual religiosity ("Importance of God"), but also possess significant explanatory power in regard to religious selection and evaluation criteria that persons apply for politicians ("Religious Leadership"). To a lesser extent these explanations are also valid for the second attitude dimension under review, the amount of influence that persons deem appropriate to be exerted on voting and government decisions by religious leaders ("Religious Influence").

Not only does the evidence gathered from this study show that higher modernization levels seem to be erosive for individual religiosity and the preferences for religious leadership. In line with Norris and Inglehart's claims for an important role of "existential security" it could be shown that higher levels of income inequality increase individual religiosity and the preferences for a stronger connection of religion and politics. Moreover, several claims of the classical secularization framework could be validated. Stronger "plausibility structures", represented by the extensity of religious laws, support individuals' views that politicians should be religious, albeit no increasing effect on religiosity or attitudes towards the influence of religious leaders could be observed.

The hypotheses derived from RC theories could not be validated. Neither does religious pluralism increase individual religiosity, nor does it have significant positive effects on the attitudes towards religion and politics, as had been reported in other studies before (cf. Halman & Petersson 2004; Carlson & Listhaug 2006). Also, no negative effect of the extent of religious laws on any of the three examined constructs could be established as would have been predicted from RC theory. An interesting finding could be observed regarding the former Socialist countries. Although respondents in these countries are not especially religious, they are relatively more in favour of the role of religious leaders in politics. A possible explanation for this finding might be the imprint which has been left by nationalistic/ethno-religious conflicts in the former Soviet Republics with religious mobilization as a political instrument which left individual notions of religiosity more or less untouched.

The examination of individual-level variables revealed the effects expected from secularization approaches. Higher income and education are factors that decrease religiosity and the preferences for a stronger relationship between religion and politics, higher age shows a positive effect. Yet these findings only partly hold regarding the religious influence dimension, where only few explanatory variables had sufficient explanatory power.

Although differences in religious belief systems are often deemed to be important for the explanation of religiosity and especially the views that persons hold regarding religion and politics, surprisingly few or rather unexpected effects were found. While it is true that Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox persons are on average more religious than

Protestants, the same does not hold regarding the other attitude dimensions. Muslims do not hold significantly different views towards religion and politics than Protestants if we take all other explanatory variables (lower modernization levels, higher inequality and more religious laws in Muslim countries) into account. This results contradicts previous findings that showed significant positive effects for Muslims even after statistical controls (cf. Norris & Inglehart 2004; Carlson & Listhaug 2006). Catholic and Orthodox respondents are even more in disfavour of a stronger connection between religion and politics than Protestants, possibly because the role that religious leaders played in these societies has been more severe or strict than in Protestant societies.

It had been hypothesized that stronger individual religiosity should less be easily transformed into stronger preferences for religious leadership in more modernized societies, due to the more private character that individuals ascribe to religiosity in this case. Yet this hypothesis could not be confirmed in a technical sense. The effect of religiosity showed to be stronger instead. The explanation, which can be given for this finding is that religious persons in all societies are in favour of a connection between religion and politics, but that it is the weak religious persons that make the difference. While this group is conforming to the general trend of approving religious leadership in less modernized societies, such preferences are expressed to a much lesser extent in modernized societies.

The last part of the paper was dedicated to an explanation of US-Exceptionalism in regard to levels of religiosity and preferences for a strong role of religious leaders in politics. Based on Norris and Inglehart's arguments as well as recent findings from the Political Economy literature (cf. Gill & Lundsgaarde 2004; Huber & Stanig 2007), the role of income inequality for the US' outlying position was examined in a counterfactual analysis. It showed that a large decrease in income inequality might also decrease the overall acceptance of religious leaders in politics, thus making the US a less outlying case in respect to other highly developed societies. However it became clear that high levels of economic insecurity cannot fully explain the US case.

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## APPENDIX

### Country samples for the different analyses

*Importance of God:* Albania (alb), Algeria (alg), Azerbaijan (aze), Argentina (arg), Australia, (aus), Austria (a), Bangladesh (bd), Armenia (arm), Belgium, (be), Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil (bra), Bulgaria (bul), Belarus (bel), Canada (cda), Chile (ch), Croatia (cro), Czech Republic (cze), Denmark (den), Dominican Republic (dom rep.), El Salvador (el s), Estonia (est), Finland (fin), France (fra), Georgia (geo), Greece (gre), Hungary (hu), Iceland (ice), Indonesia (ind), Italy (ita), Jordan (jo), Latvia (ltv), Lithuania (lt), Luxembourg (lux), Malta (mta), Mexico (mex), Morocco (mor), Netherlands (nl), New Zealand (nz), Nigeria (nig), Norway (nor), Pakistan (pak), Peru (per), Philippines (phi), Poland (pol), Romania (ro), Russia (rus), Slovakia (sk), Slovenia (slo), South Africa (rsa), Zimbabwe (zim), Spain (esp), Sweden (swe), Turkey (tur), Uganda (ug), Ukraine (ukr), Macedonia (mac), Egypt (egy), Great Britain (gb), Tanzania (tan), USA (usa), Uruguay (urg), Venezuela (ven), East Germany (ger-e), West Germany (ger-w), Northern Ireland (nir).

*Religious Leadership and Religious Influence:* Albania (alb), Algeria (alg), Argentina (arg), Austria (a), Bangladesh (bd), Belgium, (be), Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria (bul), Belarus (bel), Canada (cda), Chile (ch), Croatia (cro), Czech Republic (cze), Denmark (den), Estonia (est), Finland (fin), France (fra), Greece (gre), Hungary (hu), Iceland (ice), Indonesia (ind), Ireland (ire), Italy (ita), Jordan (jo), Latvia (ltv), Lithuania (lt), Luxembourg (lux), Malta (mta), Mexico (mex), Morocco (mor), Netherlands (nl), Nigeria (nig), Pakistan (pak), Philippines (phi), Poland (pol), Romania (ro), Russia (rus), Slovakia (sk), South Africa (rsa), Zimbabwe (zim), Spain (esp), Sweden (swe), Turkey (tur), Uganda (ug), Ukraine (ukr), Macedonia (mac), Egypt (egy), Great Britain (gb), Tanzania (tan), USA (usa), Venezuela (ven), East Germany (ger-e), West Germany (ger-w), Northern Ireland (nir).

*Table A-1* contains the descriptive statistics of all dependent and independent variables. Because the samples vary for each analysis, the statistics are each given separately.

Table A-1. Descriptive statistics for independent and dependent variables in different samples of analysis.

	<u>Importance of God</u>				<u>Religious Leadership</u>				<u>Religious Influence</u>			
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Importance of God	7.56	3.12	1	10	7.53	3.15	1	10	7.51	3.15	1	10
Religious Leadership					3.03	1.23	1	5				
Religious Influence									2.15	1.01	1	5
<i>Macro-Level</i>												
HDI	0.77	0.13	0.41	0.94	0.77	0.14	0.41	0.94	0.77	0.14	0.41	0.94
Gini-Index	0.37	0.09	0.25	0.59	0.36	0.09	0.25	0.57	0.36	0.09	0.25	0.57
Religious Laws	7.81	5.76	0	25	8.07	5.43	0	25	8.02	5.38	0	25
Religious Pluralism	0.41	0.25	0.00	0.86	0.40	0.25	0.00	0.86	0.40	0.25	0.00	0.86
Democratization	5.07	1.65	2	7	5.16	1.62	2	7	5.17	1.62	2	7
Ex. Socialist Society	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1
<i>Micro-Level</i>												
Income	4.59	2.46	1	10	4.70	2.45	1	10	4.71	2.45	1	10
Education	1.83	0.74	1	3	1.79	0.74	1	3	1.80	0.74	1	3
Age	41.37	16.28	15	98	41.77	16.20	15	98	41.76	16.18	15	98
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1	0.51	0.50	0	1	0.51	0.50	0	1
<i>Denomination</i>												
Protestant	0.15	0.36	0	1	0.15	0.35	0	1	0.15	0.35	0	1
Catholic	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1
Muslim	0.24	0.43	0	1	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.24	0.43	0	1
Orthodox	0.09	0.29	0	1	0.09	0.28	0	1	0.09	0.28	0	1
other	0.04	0.19	0	1	0.04	0.20	0	1	0.04	0.20	0	1
none	0.18	0.38	0	1	0.19	0.40	0	1	0.19	0.40	0	1
N Countries	68				55				55			
N Individuals	82298				63548				63055			

## Measurement of religious laws in countries

The following checklist has been used by Fox (2006) for the measurement of religious laws in a country. One point was added for the existence of the respective law. The variable used in this paper contains each country's total score; the original variable is called *k1998*.

Fox's data and further documentation can be found at the homepage of the Religion and State Project: <http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/>.

- Dietary laws (restrictions on the production, import, selling, or consumption of specific foods).
- Restrictions or prohibitions on the sale of alcoholic beverages.
- Personal status defined by clergy (i.e. marriage, divorce, and/or burial can only occur under religious auspices.)
- Laws of inheritance defined by religion.
- Restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion.
- Restrictions on interfaith marriages.
- Restrictions on public dress.
- Blasphemy laws, or any other restriction on speech about religion or religious figures.
- Censorship of press or other publications on grounds of being anti-religious.
- Mandatory closing of some or all businesses during religious holidays including the Sabbath or its equivalent.
- Other restrictions on activities during religious holidays including the Sabbath or its equivalent. ("blue laws").
- Religious education is standard in public schools but it is possible to opt out of this portion of the education.
- Mandatory religious education in public schools.
- Government funding of religious schools or religious educational programs in secular schools.
- Government funding of religious charitable organizations.
- Government collects taxes on behalf of religious organizations (religious taxes).
- Official government positions, salaries or other funding for clergy.
- Funding for religious organizations or activities other than those listed above.
- Clergy and/or speeches in places of worship require government approval.
- Some official clerical positions made by government appointment.
- Presence of an official government ministry or department dealing with religious affairs.
- Certain government officials are also given an official position in the state church by virtue of their political office (i.e. the Queen of England is also head of Anglican Church.)
- Certain religious officials become government officials by virtue of their religious position (i.e. as in Iran).
- Some or all government officials must meet certain religious requirements in order to hold office.

- Presence of religious courts which have jurisdiction over some matters of law.
- Seats in Legislative branch and/or Cabinet are by law or custom granted, at least in part, along religious lines.
- Prohibitive restrictions on abortion.
- The presence of religious symbols on the state's flag.
- Religion listed on state identity cards.
- Religious organizations must register with government in order to obtain official status.
- Presence of an official government body which monitors 'sects' or minority religions.
- Restrictions on women other than those listed above. (i.e. restrictions on education, jobs that they can hold, or on appearing in public without a chaperon.)
- Other religious prohibitions or practices that are mandatory.