CHAPTER 10

INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY

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The concept of Individual Modernity deals with the psychological characteristics that are supposed to become dominant among individuals as societies move through the far-ranging socioeconomic transformations known as *modernization*. Thus, the concept individual modernity is a specific version of modernization theory focusing on the subjective dimension of modernization. Because individual modernity is addressing psychological orientations that are assumed to emerge, it is directly related to theories of cultural change or value change, such as the theory of post-materialism or the theory of rising emancipative values. As a psychological concept, individual modernity overlaps with the concepts of the "democratic character" and "open-mindedness" or "personality strength." The subsequent sections try to outline important aspects of these connections.

1 The Individual Modernity Scale

The term individual modernity has been introduced by Alex Inkeles (1969, 1978, 1983) who invented a scale of "overall modernity" (OM scale) to measure specifically modern psychological orientations among individuals. Unlike standard modernization theory, which concentrates on objective socioeconomic transformations, the concept of individual modernity is focusing on the psychological effects of modernization

on people. It is searching for the "sociocultural aspects of development" (Inkeles 1978, 49). Accordingly, this theory operates at the micro-level.

Neutrally formulated, individual modernity comprises all orientations that become dominant psychological traits as modernization processes, such as industrialization and urbanization, transform the living conditions of individuals. It is assumed that the orientations of modern individuals become lasting personality traits, meaning that the *modal type of personality* changes in the wake of modernization, creating a "new man" who changes the cultural outlook of entire societies. Thus, collective changes of individual-level psychological attributes accumulate to cultural changes at the societal level, reshaping a society's prevailing psychological constitution. Looking at the concrete attitudes and orientations that constitute individual modernity, Inkeles (1978, 49) identified:

(1) an open attitude to new experience (open-mindedness);
(2) allegiance to secular authority (secularism);
(3) a positivist belief in scientific progress (positivism);
(4) a strong achievement orientation (meritocratism);
(5) a rational attitude towards careful planning (rationalism);
(6) a participant attitude to politics and community affairs (activism);
(7) a super-local identification with the nation (nationalism).

As modernization advances, ever more persons will be characterized by these orientations, making populations more open-minded and more secular, positivist, rational, activist, and achievement oriented.

2 Individual Modernity and the Civic Culture

Inkeles emphasized that the "modern personality" is not necessarily a "democratic personality." In this point he explicitly declared disagreement with Almond and Verba's (1963) civic culture approach:

> Those familiar with the Civic Culture will recognize these traits as very similar to those delineated by Almond and Verba as defining the model of a democratic citizen. According to them the citizen of a democratic polity is expected . . . to stress activity, involvement, rationality. . . . But I hold that exactly the same qualities are appropriate to . . . the citizen of a one-party dictatorship such as that found in the Soviet Union. . . . It seems, therefore, that Almond and Verba have labeled as specifically "democratic" something which is a more general requirement placed upon the citizen of a modern state, whether democratic or otherwise. (Inkeles 1969, 255)

Inkeles' attempt to set his approach apart from Almond and Verba was partly misleading, for these authors, too, emphasized the distinction between "democratic"

and "modern" qualities. In fact Almond and Verba (1963, 5) claimed that what they consider as the psychological underpinnings of a democratic order—the civic culture—"is not a modern culture, but one that combines modernity with tradition." More appropriately, Inkeles would have distanced himself from Harold D. Lasswell (1951) who indeed described a set of orientations similar to Inkeles' "modern personality" as the hallmark of a "democratic personality." Almond and Verba for their part dissociated their civic culture approach from Lasswell's democratic personality approach arguing that "Lasswell's democratic qualities are not specifically *political* [italics in the original] attitudes and feelings, and they may actually be encountered in great frequency in societies that are not democratic in structure" (Almond and Verba 1963, 10). Almond and Verba denied the democratic quality of such orientations as open-mindedness and self-esteem, which Lasswell defined as inherently democratic. Almond and Verba were interested in a civic culture that helps sustain a democratic political order. They believed that such a culture is not built on general psychological orientations towards life and people but consists of specifically political orientations that confer legitimacy to given institutions and the political system at large. Accordingly, satisfaction with democracy and commitment to democratic procedures are of more direct relevance to the stability and florescence of democratic regimes than such personality attributes as self-esteem and open-mindedness (Almond and Verba 1963, 15).

Still, there is a connection between the two approaches. For example, Almond and Verba place strong emphasis on "subjective competence" (i.e. the feeling of individual competence) as an orientation that democratic citizens need because democratic systems require active participation in politics. This is only possible if people feel sufficiently competent in political matters. In this light a linkage between Almond and Verba's subjective competence (also conceptualized as "internal efficacy") and Lasswell's self-esteem is intuitively plausible: logically, people who have more self-esteem than others have most likely also stronger feelings of competence. Sniderman's (1975) research has demonstrated that this linkage indeed exists. In other words, there is a connection between general orientations towards people and life, on one hand, and political regime preferences, on the other hand.

3 Two Variants of Modernity: Democratic and Totalitarian

Almond and Verba's notion reflects the prevailing view of modernization in the 1960s and 1970s when one saw open-minded attitudes linked with modernization but not with democracy. For not all modern mass polities have been democratic ones. Sniderman (1975, 220) summarizes this view when speculating that

> the same psychological qualities that distinguish a democrat in the United States may well characterize a communist in Soviet Russia; for insofar as the linkage between personality and political ideology is a matter of social learning, then high self-esteem . . . ought to drive individuals towards accepting the norms of their political culture, whatever those be.

This presumes that each political order is equally capable to instill in its people the values that sustain it. In other words, both democratic and totalitarian orders have the capacity to cope with modernization and with the open-minded orientations coming along with modernization.

Early on modernization was supposed to bring social mobilization and mass inclusion into politics (Deutsch 1963). But leading scholars such as Huntington (1968) emphasized that social mobilization and mass political involvement does not necessarily lead to capitalist western democracy. In line with Moore (1966) many social scientists considered the Soviet type of communist dictatorship as another variant of modernization. The fact that the Soviet model was totalitarian has not been seen as a contradiction to modernization. Quite the contrary, totalitarianism itself has been considered as a genuinely modern configuration of the state (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965). In the same vein, Loewenstein (1957) and O'Donnell (1973) theorized about specifically modern forms of authoritarianism (for a revival of the idea of modern autocracies see de Mesquita and Downs 2005). Consequently, modern psychological orientations have not at all been seen as identical to democratic orientations. Modern orientations have been considered as compatible with any type of modern political order, be it democratic or not. Among the few scholars disagreeing with this view already in the 1960s was Parsons (1964). He reasoned that, because modernization has an inherently logical tendency to democratic freedom, all attempts to nurture modernization without democratization are doomed to fail. Parsons explicitly predicted the failure of the Soviet system for exactly this reason, prophesying that this system will either internally democratize or break down, for lack of democratic legitimacy will limit the capacity of the Soviet system to mobilize resources in competition with western democracy.

4 Democratic Personality and Open-Mindedness

These contrasting view points raise the question "Are modern orientations equivalent to democratic orientations or not?" This question is so fundamental that it seems worthwhile to look back at what Lasswell himself described as the psychological attributes of a democratic personality. Unlike Almond and Verba, Lasswell saw an inherent democratic quality in people's orientations towards life and people in general, thinking that these general world-views manifest a deep-seated predisposition to authoritarian or democratic orders. Lasswell listed the following

orientations towards life and people as the ones establishing a fundamental predisposition in favor of democratic orders (1951, 495–503):

(1) an "open ego," which means an "inclusive" attitude to others (inclusiveness);
(2) a "multi-valued" orientation that can cope with ambiguity (versatility);
(3) "confidence in human potentialities" (humanism);
(4) "self-esteem;" and
(5) "freedom from anxiety."

These building blocs are hierarchically ordered. At the origin is freedom from anxiety or the absence of threat perceptions which nurtures self-esteem and humanism because people who are free from anxiety do not have to fear failure; instead, they can consider their own failures as a source of learning (which nurtures self-esteem). Likewise, people who are free from anxiety do not have to fear that other people differ from them; instead, diversity among people can be considered as a source of stimulation (which nurtures humanism). Versatility and inclusiveness then develop as natural corollaries of self-esteem and humanism. This view is strongly influenced by Erich Fromm's (1942) insight that self-respect and respecting others are two flipsides of the same coin: a generally philanthropic attitude. By the same token, contempt of people in general is often an indication of an unconscious inferiority complex.

There is considerable overlap between Lasswell's democratic qualities and what Rokeach (1960, 71–9) described as "open belief systems" or its opposite, "closed belief systems." Rokeach measured open- versus closed-mindedness by a "dogmatism scale" whose dogmatic pole includes the following (among other things): a strong belief into authority; intolerance of diversity; fatalism; low self-esteem; and threat perceptions. Again, threat perceptions are seen as the root of the whole syndrome, closing people's mind in making them intolerant and obsessed with ingroup favoritism (to this point see the work of Monroe 1996). The closed type of belief systems in turn is very similar to Adorno's concept of the "authoritarian personality" (Adorno et al. 1950). In light of these conceptual overlaps it seems plausible to consider the two polarities between closed and open beliefs, on one hand, and between authoritarian and democratic orientations, on the other hand, as largely synonymous. Thus, closed beliefs can be equated with authoritarian orientations and open beliefs with democratic orientations, with many possible mixtures in the gray area between the two extreme ends on this continuum.

Given that an individual's location on the continuum between authoritarian (closed) and democratic (open) beliefs is assumed to be rooted in threat perceptions, one has a theory at hand to predict under which conditions populations might change their prevalent orientation from one pole of the continuum to the other. Accordingly, one would assume that disasters that are perceived as existential threats, such as economic shocks, terrorism, collective violence, wars, or natural catastrophes, make people more closed-minded, leading them to accept authoritarian solutions of given problems. Vice versa, if people experience freedom from anxiety through sustained periods of affluence, peace, and security, they open their mind,

adopting the orientations that lead them to reject unlimited and uncontrolled authority, whether religious or political.

Beyond the attention of political scientists, cross-cultural psychologists (Triandis 1995, 60) have described the closed/authoritarian versus open/democratic polarity in terms of "conformism versus individualism," postulating an inherent linkage between the prevalence of conformist orientations and dictatorial systems and the prevalence of individualistic orientations and democratic systems (see also Rokeach 1973).

5 Open-Mindedness and Personality Strength

There is no question in psychology that self-esteem and open-mindedness are attributes indicating personality strength, mental health, subjective well-being, and even human development (Ryan and Deci 2000). But are these orientations modern in the sense that they emerge in the course of modernization? Or isn't it so that modernization causes psychopathological effects, mass depression, and alienation? Attempting to answer this question, Inkeles and Diamond (1980) analyzed a set of open-minded orientations, including "anti-authoritarianism, efficacy, satisfaction, participation, trust, benevolence, optimism." All of these orientations have been found to be more widespread in economically more advanced societies. A nation's overall level of economic development showed an independent effect on the strength of these attitudes, even controlling for people's individual characteristics. Accordingly, it seems after all indeed justified to equate open-minded orientations with modern orientations.

But what about the democraticness of open-minded orientations? We have learned that Inkeles and others rejected Lasswell's claim that these orientations are of an inherently democratic nature. However, research by Rosenberg (1956), Rokeach (1973), and Sniderman (1975, 217) suggests that self-esteem and open-mindedness strengthen commitment to democratic norms:

> In any event, individual differences in self-esteem evidently exercise a profound influence over attitudes to politics.... Then, too, low self-esteem weakens commitment to the norms of democratic politics and strengthens susceptibility to the varieties of extremist politics. There is, then, much to recommend to the basic insight of such scholars as Mannheim and Lasswell who perceived the connection between the character of men and the kind of society they favor. (Sniderman 1975, 222)

From this point of view one would disagree with Inkeles, maintaining that modern and democratic psychological attributes are not so categorically different; and one would disagree with Almond and Verba, insisting that general psychological

dispositions, even though they are not directly related to political questions, do affect political orders. However, this claim could not be analyzed until recently, because its investigation requires data about the beliefs of people in societies of a wide range of political orders. On a broad basis, such data became available only recently with the World Values Surveys.

6 The Universality of Psychological Orientations

Cross-cultural research in the tradition of Inkeles showed little interest in specifically democratic orientations; the intention was to explore universally modern orientations that are to be found in all types of modern mass polities, be they democratic or not. Following Max Weber, Inkeles conceptualized modernization in terms of processes that were also going on in non-democratic societies, including industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization, rationalization, secularization, and expanding education. Accordingly, Inkeles assumed that modern attitudes emerge primarily within contexts shaped by these forces. Empirically, Inkeles could indeed demonstrate that participative, innovative, secular, and rational orientations had been more pronounced among people working in industrial factories, people having attended a university, and people with more exposure to modern mass media. This has been shown in surveys among people from culturally diverse societies, including third world countries, supporting the claim that psychological changes toward individual modernity are not culture specific but universal.

The question of the universality of basic psychological orientations has been a guiding question in cross-cultural psychology and value research. Based on Rokeach's (1973) work on the nature of human beliefs, Shalom Schwartz (2003) attempted to map the universal structure of human values based on data from student-teacher samples from societies around the world. He could indeed demonstrate the existence of a "value circle" that structures the value orientations of people in any society along two universal conflicting principles: (*a*) one representing a polarity between values of self-enhancement and self-transcendence (which could well be understood as *egocentric versus altruistic values*); and (*b*) another representing a polarity between values of self-direction/stimulation versus conformity/security (often understood as *individualism versus collectivism*).

The existence of this universal structure does not foreclose that people in different societies emphasize opposite poles in the value structure. Quite the contrary, much of the research in cross-cultural psychology has been emphasizing the distinction between "individualistic" and "collectivist" cultures, showing that, even if one controls for an individual's personal background, culture shows an independent

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impact, leaving a more individualistic or collectivist imprint on people (Hofstede 1980; Triandis 1995; Markus, Kitayama, and Heiman 1996; Kuehnen and Oyserman 2002). However, studies in cross-cultural psychology are static in the sense that they treat culture simply as a given that is not itself exposed to changes by socioeconomic forces. Collective changes in psychological orientations from one pole to the other are not studied in this branch of research, for culture is conceptualized as a constant. Theories of value change take an opposite view.

7 Theories of Modern Value Change

Inkeles' concept of individual modernity assumes a psychological dynamic: fundamental changes in people's orientations are supposed to occur as societies modernize. Under the notion of "value change," the dynamic aspect of changing psychological orientations among modern mass publics has been most extensively researched by Inglehart (1977, 1990). His theory of postmaterialistic value change has a number of points in common with Inkeles' personality approach. It starts from psychological assumptions and states that people's orientations are shaped in a sustained way by socioeconomic forces. This is plausible under the premise that socioeconomic forces change people's basic living conditions and that people's value orientations reflect their living conditions (or the experiences deriving from them). Under these premises Inglehart provides a more explicit theory about the mechanism by which socioeconomic forces change people's psychological orientations (see Inglehart chapter in this volume).

Starting from Abraham Maslow's (1954) pyramid of human needs, Inglehart assumes that psychological orientations are hierarchically ordered, such that lower-ordered needs must be fulfilled first before higher-ordered needs can emerge. Lower-ordered needs are *physiological* survival needs. Inglehart labels them "materialist" because their satisfaction requires the proliferation of material products such as food, shelter, and all kinds of commodities and technical equipment. Higher-ordered needs are *psychological* self-actualization needs. Inglehart calls them "postmaterialistic" because in order to satisfy them, non-material achievements such as political freedom are needed. Another facet of Inglehart's theory is based on the concept of formative socialization. It is conventional wisdom in lifespan psychology (Maier and Vaupel 2003) that experiences one makes during adolescence have a more lasting imprint on one's orientation in life than later experiences. Thus, experiences in one's formative years lead to the crystallization of relatively stable personality attributes (see also Easton and Dennis 1969).

Combining the formative experiences-thesis with the need hierarchy-thesis, one comes to the conclusion that socioeconomic development, if it happens, leads to a gradual replacement of materialist value priorities with postmaterialist priorities and

that this process is driven by the younger cohorts replacing the older ones in the course of generational population replacement.

Accordingly, if socioeconomic conditions improve fundamentally from one generation to the next, the younger generation that is growing up under the improved conditions will experience the satisfaction of its material needs. Material need-satisfaction will become the new generation's formative experience so that its members take it for granted, opening their minds to higher-ordered concerns. Accordingly the new generation will feel the need of postmaterialistic achievements, placing more emphasis on environmental protection, meaning of life, and self-determination. The older generation will also experience more affluence but its formative experiences will leave on it a lasting imprint, such that the older generation continues to prioritize materialistic goals over postmaterialistic ones. Consequently, the affluence-driven value change from materialistic to postmaterialistic values will advance only as the older generation dies out.

According to Inglehart, individual modernity is reflected in postmaterialism. Postmaterialists have a post-economic preference structure in which concerns of the material living standard are replaced by lifestyle concerns about the ecological, cultural, and political quality of life. Inglehart's theory is correct in a number of fundamental points. But it can be refined or at least sharpened in three major aspects (for recent discussion see Clarke et al. 1999; Davis and Davenport 1999; Inglehart and Abramson 1999).

8 Continuing Salience of Economic Orientations

First, one does not need to be a survey expert to realize that post-economic issues have not at all replaced economic ones on the agenda of postindustrial societies. Electoral campaigns are still fought around economic issues and economic issues continue to dominate most voters' concerns. Since twenty years there is nothing that concerns voters in Western Europe more than mass unemployment, the increase of a low-wage sector, welfare state retrenchment and public austerity. Also, today's youth is in no way less consumption oriented than earlier generations (Deutsche Shell 2002). Postmaterialist values do also not hinder consumption needs to emerge on a higher level of sophistication. The highest need on Maslow's hierarchy, self-actualization, can be defined in rather hedonic terms, that is, in terms of luxury lifestyles and exotic experiences that require a lot of money to afford them, still making people concerned about their salaries and other material benefits. Put differently, material needs do not end after the first step in Maslow's ladder; they evolve the whole way up to the highest step. True, there are primary material needs: the sheer survival needs of

food and shelter. But material survival needs are succeeded by more sophisticated secondary and tertiary material needs. Again, if a society reaches higher layers in the Maslowian pyramid of need satisfaction, material needs do not vanish; they become more sophisticated. Inglehart himself does most likely not deny this. But his writings have too often taken to the extreme to mean that materialistic preferences are replaced with postmaterialistic ones. This needs some clarification.

Hence, a first qualification of the postmaterialism thesis is that postmaterialist values do not simply *replace* materialist ones. Instead, postmaterialistic values are *added to* still existing materialistic values. Thus, there is not so much a replacement as a widening of people's value repertory, which allows people to change priorities according to circumstances (Klein and Poetschke 2000). Evidence from the Eurobarometer illustrated in Figure 10.1 shows that, even though over the past thirty years there has been a sharp decline in the proportion of "pure" materialists, the proportion of "pure" postmaterialists did not increase to the same extent as pure



Fig. 10.1 Change in Materialist-Postmaterialist Priorities in 5 EU-Countries

Source: Data for France, Germany (West), Italy, Belgium, Netherlands (samples equally weighed). Data from 1970 are from Eurobarometer, data for 2000 from World Values Survey 1999–2001.

materialists diminished. A considerable portion of the decrease of pure materialists has been compensated by an increase of "mixed" materialists and postmaterialists. Only the "pure" form of materialism diminishes while materialism as such continues to exist—in combination with postmaterialism (as the prevalence of mixed types clearly illustrates). This value change is better described as a postmaterialist expansion rather than replacement of values.

9 Liberal rather than Postmaterialist Values

Second, time-series evidence for a long-term increase in postmaterialist values is only available for the liberal items "freedom of speech" and "giving more say" but not for ecological items such as "making our countryside more beautiful" or idealistic items such as "having a society in which ideas count more than money." The term postmaterialism, however, is only useful as long as it is needed as an umbrella term to summarize a variety of conceptually distinct orientations, including liberal, ecological, and idealistic orientations. As long as available evidence for value changes is limited to liberal orientations only, it is more specific to call them just what they are: liberty aspirations. This term also represents more precisely these orientations' major thrust: civil and political freedom. In line with this reasoning, Welzel (2006) demonstrates that keeping the liberal components of postmaterialism separate is essential to discover attitudinal effects on democratic institutions. A positive attitudinal effect on the development of democracy is only demonstrable for liberty aspirations but not for the other components of postmaterialism. For this reason, Welzel (2006) follows Brint (1984) and Flanagan (1987) who prefer to label these attitudes as liberty aspirations rather than postmaterialist orientations. Subsequent paragraphs follow this use of the term as well.

10 Economic Security and Individual Autonomy

Still another argument supports this point. Following Lasswell (1951), Maslow (1954), and Rokeach (1960) it is quite plausible that such an open-minded orientation as liberty aspirations emerges from freedom of anxiety, that is, under less pressing and more permissive and comfortable existential conditions. The theory of postmaterialism

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goes along with this argument but presumes that *economic security* is the single most important aspect in making existential conditions more permissive.

This interpretation is not easy to reconcile with the fact that the post-1968 generation, which has been socialized under the oil-shocks and a continuing welfare state crises, experienced much lower levels of job security and much less secure social benefits than the baby-boomers, but still continues to show more strongly liberal orientations than previous generations, as Figure 10.2 illustrates.[1] According to the theory of formative years, the post-1968 generations should show less liberal values, if economic security is the major factor in making existential conditions more permissive. But they continue to show greater liberty aspirations. This raises doubts against economic security as the major driving force behind liberty aspirations.



Fig. 10.2 Generational Differences in Liberty Aspirations over 30 Years

[1] Liberty aspirations are measured on a 0–3 ordinal index based on the libertarian items "protecting freedom of speech" and "giving people more say in important government decisions." These items are included in Inglehart's most widely used materialism-postmaterialism battery, which asks respondents to choose a first and second priority from four items (the other two items being "maintaining order in the nation" and "fighting rising prices"). Respondents are scored 0 on the liberty aspiration index if they attribute neither first nor second priority to any of the two liberty items. They are scored 1 if they attribute

An alternative to the experience of economic security as the source of liberty aspirations is the experience of individual autonomy. This experience continues indeed to grow as the individualization thesis suggests (Beck 2002), even though economic security declined since the 1970s. Thus, the continuing increase of liberty aspirations among succeeding cohorts in Western publics is more plausibly explained by a corresponding increase of individual autonomy than by a corresponding increase of economic security (for such an increase simply does not exist).

Evidence to this point is provided by the World Values Survey (using either the pooled data set or a sub-sample containing postindustrial societies only). If one accepts income as an indicator of economic security and level of education[2] as an indicator of individual autonomy (or intellectual autonomy which is a basic aspect of individual autonomy), then individual autonomy has a greater impact on individual-level liberty aspirations than economic security because education correlates at r=.17 while income correlates at r=.11 with liberty aspirations. But what about *perceived* economic security and *perceived* individual autonomy? Taking financial satisfaction as an indicator of perceived economic security and perceived control over life as an indicator of perceived autonomy, autonomy is more important than security because life control correlates at r=.07 with liberty aspirations, whereas financial satisfaction correlates even negatively, at r=-.02, with liberty aspirations. In multivariate regression the relative weight of these effects remains the same: education is a better predictor of liberty aspirations than income, and perceived control over one's life is a better predictor than financial satisfaction.

The evidence is even clearer at the aggregate level. For that matter I use per capita GDP as a measure of economic security and the size of the service sector in percent of the workforce as a proxy for individualization, the reason being that postindustrial service economies nurture the social complexity that makes individuals more autonomous in shaping their connections to others. Using measures of these two variables from 1990 to predict national percentages of people showing moderate to strong liberty aspirations in the mid-1990s (N=65), the effect of service sector size is definitely stronger and more significant (beta=.60 significant at the .000-level) than

second priority to one of these items, 2 if they attribute first priority to one of these items and 3 if both first and second priorities are attributed to these items. The percentage of people with moderate-strong liberty aspirations shown in Figures 10.2 and 10.3 indicates the percentage of respondents scoring 2 or 3 on the liberty aspiration index (which is equivalent to adding up mixed and pure postmaterialists in Inglehart's terminology). Note that Inglehart and Welzel (2005) use a more extended version of this index that ranges from 0 to 5 as they include priorities on the item "giving people more say on how things are done in their jobs and community." This item, however, is included in another battery that has not been used as widely and is therefore not available for extensive time-series analyses.

[2] One might argue that level of education is also an indicator of economic security during one's formative years because people from better socioeconomic backgrounds are usually the ones obtaining higher education. This argument is plausible to the extent that there is a match between an individual's attained level of education and his or her parents' socioeconomic status. No question, this match exists. But it is far from being perfect (fortunately). Correlations are usually in a range of .20 to .30, meaning that some 5 to 10 percent in an individual's education attainment can be attributed to economic security in people's formative years. Education is also a means of upward mobility to escape the less privileged socioeconomic status of one's parents. Hence, one cannot simply take education as a proxy for economic security in formative years.

the effect of per capita GDP (beta=.27, significant at the .02-level). Again, the increase of individual autonomy (as a consequence of individualization) seems to be as important, if not more important, in giving rise to liberty aspirations as economic security.

11 Pre-Industrial Freeholder Societies and Rich Oil-Exporting Societies

This is plausible from still another perspective. Usually economic security and individual autonomy are closely intertwined but sometimes these two experiences can fall apart. The cases in which this happens are rare but illustrative. One such rare case is rich oil-exporting countries of today; another one is freeholder societies of pre-industrial times.

The publics of the super-rich oil-exporting countries, such as Bahrain or the Emirates, are economically more secure than any other in the world. But they do not show any sign of strong liberty aspirations among their publics, even though they provide generous welfare benefits for the population at large. The reason for this perplexing phenomenon could be that individualization is not far advanced in these societies. Despite material affluence, these societies are still shaped by traditional social patterns. A rent-seeking economy based on the exploitation of natural resources does not have the same modernizing effects as a knowledge economy, even if exploiting oil makes rich (Boix 2003). By contrast, pre-industrial freeholder and merchant societies, such as North America, England, the Lowlands, and Switzerland in the eighteenth century, have been far from being rich by today's standards. People have not been economically secure in absence of a welfare state that takes care of the most existential risks. But as owners of their land and as autonomous agents on the market they experienced a considerable degree of individual autonomy. Not coincidentally, exactly these meritocratic middle-class societies have shown strong indications of mass liberty aspirations when freeholders and town dwellers demanded civil rights and "no taxation without representation" in the liberal revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Individual autonomy seems to be as important to liberty aspirations as economic security. The experience of autonomy in pursuing one's daily activities is essential to nurture a basic sense of human agency, which makes people receptive to the idea of civil and political freedom, leading them to question unlimited and uncontrolled authority. This is not to say that economic security is unimportant. Quite the contrary, as the next section will show, economic security is important in promoting liberty aspirations. But its effect should be considered in connection with individual autonomy.

12 Value Change through Generational Shifts and Periodic Fluctuations

The theory of postmaterialism needs additional qualification in a third aspect. There are tremendous periodic shifts between weaker and stronger liberty aspirations, depending on current inflation rates. Eurobarometer data illustrated in Figure 10.3 show an amazing coincidence between fluctuations in the consumer price index and liberty aspirations, such that higher inflation rates bring less emphasis on liberty, whereas lower inflation rates bring more emphasis on liberty.[3] These shifts are so pronounced that they are not easily reconcilable with the thesis that liberty aspirations are a stable personality



Fig. 10.3 Periodic Fluctuations and Stable Cohort Differences in Liberty Aspirations

[3] I can assure that the pattern shown in Figure 10.3 is not an artifact of the crude generational categorizations. A more fine-grained differentiation, using nine instead of three cohort categories, shows exactly the same pattern (see Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 106) but makes the graph nearly unreadable.

attribute. If this were the case, they must not be that sensitive to fluctuations in the economic cycle.

The finding of huge situational fluctuations confirms "regulatory focus theory" in psychology (Foerster, Higgins, and Idson 1998). This theory does not consider people's psychological orientation as a stable personality attribute but as situation shaped. Based on experimental evidence it is argued that people switch into a "prevention orientation" focusing on avoidance and security in pressing situations, whereas they switch into a "promotion orientation" focusing on achievement and unfolding in more permissive situations. Depending on the situation, all people—irrespective of personality characteristics—can be brought into a prevention or a promotion focus. The cyclical fluctuations in liberty aspirations can be interpreted as reflecting exactly this mechanism. Higher inflation means an economically more pressing situation, leading people to adopt a less liberal orientation in prioritizing economic security (i.e. a prevention focus). Conversely, lower inflation rates imply an economically more permissive situation leading people to switch to a more liberal orientation in preferring freedom of expression (i.e. a promotion focus).

Yet, it would be premature to give up the idea of stable personality attributes altogether. For the same evidence showing strong situational fluctuations in liberty aspirations also shows stable generational differences in liberty aspirations. The generational differences in liberty aspirations remain constant throughout every up and down of the inflation cycle, with each new generation fluctuating on a higher level of liberty aspirations than the previous one. Thus, although people's priorities fluctuate, they fluctuate around different generational *baselines*, the baselines themselves being rather stable. These generational baselines reflect the existential experiences in people's formative years, such that generations having made more pressing formative experiences fluctuate around a less liberal baseline; whereas generations having made more permissive existential experiences in their formative years fluctuate around a more liberal baseline. A cohort's baseline is a stable personality attribute but situational adjustments around the given baseline are nevertheless possible.

This is a fundamental insight into the logic of collective changes in psychological orientations. People's psychological orientations reflect both current circumstances *and* formative experiences. And both follow the same existential logic, pointing to three effects, each of which is observable in Figure 10.3:

(1) More pressing existential experiences in formative years anchor people's orientation-baseline at less liberal priorities; more permissive existential experiences in formative years anchor their orientation-baseline at more liberal priorities. As each new generation of people in western Europe has been socialized into more favorable existential conditions than the previous one, the orientation-baselines are anchored at more liberal priorities with each new generation (although the size of the increase diminishes in recent generations).
(2) Because existential conditions continued to be more permissive, the cohorts' given baselines themselves are slowly moving upward toward more liberal

priorities. This effect is in flat contradiction to the life-cycle thesis, which tells us that people become less liberal as they age.

(3) Irrespective of the location of the orientation-baseline, fluctuations in current existential conditions lead to fluctuations of people's priorities around their baseline, with more pressing current conditions causing downward fluctuations toward less liberal priorities and more permissive current circumstances leading to more liberal priorities.[4]

Again, these three effects—stable baseline differences between generations, upwardly directed baselines over the long-run, short-term fluctuations around the baselines—all follow the same existential logic: Diminishing external constraints on autonomous choice make people more liberty oriented.

13 Two Sets of Modern Values: Rational Values and Emancipative Values

As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) illustrate, liberty aspirations are the central component in a broader set of values, which they call self-expression values or emancipative values. Besides (1) an esteem of human freedom reflected in liberty aspirations, this fivefold syndrome includes: (2) an esteem of political self-expression reflected in participating in elite-challenging actions such as petitions; (3) an esteem of nonconformity reflected in a tolerance of homosexuality; (4) an esteem of other people reflected in generalized interpersonal trust; and (5) a sense of being at peace with oneself reflected in high levels of life satisfaction. It is clear that this syndrome of emancipative values is perfectly compatible with Lasswell's focus on self-esteem and esteeming others as the ingredients of a democratic personality.

Inglehart and Welzel demonstrate that emancipative values are a modern set of values in the sense that these values emerge in the wake of major socioeconomic transformations. Thus, one can consider the syndrome of emancipative values as a more recent elaboration of individual modernity. But emancipative values have to be set apart from another distinct set of values that also matures in the course of modernization: secular-rational values (henceforth: rational values). Both types of values, rational and emancipative ones, arise with modernization but do it to different

[4] Note that the (perceived) pressingness versus permissiveness of existential conditions is not only a matter of economic circumstances. It is also a matter of physical security. Thus, increasing crime rates, threats through political violence, civil war, or terrorism can also be perceived as pressing conditions that decrease the priority on liberty concerns. Hence, it is conceivable that the threat of international terror or the perceived threat of immigration shift the publics' emphasis toward less libertarian values.

degrees in different phases of modernization. Rational values emerge most powerfully during the industrial phase of modernization. The bureaucratizing, centralizing, and standardizing tendencies of industrialization give rise to a mechanical worldview that nurtures rational values. By contrast, emancipative values emerge most powerfully during the postindustrial phase of modernization. The de-standardizing and individualizing tendencies of postindustrialization give rise to a human-centric worldview that nurtures emancipative values.

14 Rational Values: Modern but not Democratic

Both sets of values have tremendous implications for people's authority orientations, bringing wide-ranging consequences for the power structure of political orders. Rational values legitimate authority in tying it to public consent (or its pretence), bringing mass involvement into politics and universal suffrage. This does not necessarily lead to democracy. Rational authority is instead perfectly compatible with an authoritarian power structure. Accordingly, Inglehart and Welzel demonstrate that industrialization goes together with rational values but societies with strongly rational values do not show a specific affinity to democratic systems of governance. Thus, the early emphasis on the distinction between modern values and democratic values is correct—as long as we restrict modern values to rational values.

15 Emancipative Values: Modern and Democratic

With emancipative values we come to a different conclusion. Emancipative values do not legitimate authority; they question it. With rational values, authority that is external to individuals, enshrined in extra-individual bodies such as the state, remains fully legitimate. In sharp contrast, emancipative values internalize authority into the self, seeing nothing more dignified than the decision-making freedom of the individual human being and the equality of all human beings in this decision-making freedom. This emancipative thrust is inherently inconsistent with unlimited or uncontrolled authority, however efficient and rational, making any sort of authoritarian system unsustainable when emancipative values emerge.

Indeed, as Inglehart and Welzel show, there is a stunning .90 correlation between the spread of emancipative values in a society and its level of democracy across a worldwide sample of 74 nations. Further, more widespread emancipative values make democracies more, not less, efficacious. This is reflected in the fact that the spread of emancipative values is closely correlated with all five of the World Bank's "good governance" indicators (Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch 2005). These values make publics self-assertive, defiant, and troublesome for decision makers. But exactly this means healthy pressures to keep elites honest, accountable, and responsive to what people want. Anyway, the distinction between modern values and democratic values vanishes when we focus on emancipative values, which are both modern and democratic.

16 Conclusion

These insights provide a late confirmation of Lasswell's approach. This is not only true because emancipative values come very close to what Lasswell described as the democratic character. Also, emancipative values do not contain any explicit reference to political regimes but nevertheless, as Inglehart and Welzel demonstrate extensively, show a much stronger impact on political orders than any regime-related attitude—disconfirming the premise of Almond and Verba that only specifically political attitudes are relevant for political regimes. In fact, psychological orientations towards life and people in general are more relevant.

In conclusion, the essence of emerging emancipative values lies in the fact that they are both modern and democratic. As Inglehart and Welzel argue, the emergence of these values transforms modernization into a process of human development that makes existing polities ever more people-centered, fueling such tendencies as consumer protection, gender equality or same sex marriage. In any event, the syndrome of emancipative values can be seen as a measure of both individual modernity and individual democraticness. The frequency of this orientation among populations is very closely associated with a society's democratic performance.

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