

Democratization in the Human Development Perspective

Christian Welzel¹

ABSTRACT

This article describes a model that considers the emergence and florescence of democracies as something embedded in a more encompassing evolutionary process. Democratization in this light is the institutional component of a broader process of human development that promotes people empowerment on various fronts. In this process increasing individual resources give rise to emancipative values that in turn release democratizing social pressures.

Introduction

This article describes a model that considers the emergence and florescence of democracies as something embedded in a more encompassing evolutionary process. Democratization, in this light, is the institutional component of a broader process of human development. Sen (1999) introduced the term human development. The basic idea of the concept, the enhancement of human choice, has been further elaborated by Welzel (2002) in an attempt to bring emancipative values into the concept. Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) illustrated the empirical validity of this approach, while Inglehart and Welzel (2005) illuminated its wider implications. This article summarizes the human development approach and its view on democracy.

The concept of human development proposed by Welzel integrates economic, cultural, and institutional changes into one theme: the social

¹ International University Bremen.

practice of human choice; that is, the extent to which people pursue self-chosen preferences in shaping their daily activities and lives in general. The human development of societies advances to the extent to which human choice becomes a practiced standard in the respective society. How much this is the case can be measured in three aspects of social reality, as I will show.

Human Development and Human Nature

Analogous to psychology, where human development means the maturation of a person's ability to set one's own preferences and to actualize oneself (Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan 2003), the human development of whole societies means progress towards conditions that enable, stimulate, and entitle people to shape their lives based on their own choices. Thus, the human development of entire societies is equivalent to the empowerment of their people in pursuing intrinsic choices.

From the viewpoint of self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2000; Ryan and Deci 2000), a development that features self-generated choices deserves the attribute "human" because the potential to make autonomous choices, to follow intrinsic motivations, and to express and direct oneself, is the most distinctive property of the human species; people's potential to self-actualization constitutes the "human" potential inherent in any society. Societies do not differ in this human potential. They differ in the social conditions that enable, stimulate, and entitle people to develop and realize their human potential. The concept of human development intends to measure exactly these differences in the "human" condition of societies. It assumes constancy in people's human potential, but variation in the social conditions that allow this potential to unfold.

A cultural relativist might object that there can be no universally acceptable definition of human development because the understanding of what is human differs from one culture to the next. In particular, a relativist might argue that my concept's focus on pursuing self-chosen preferences reflects a typically Western fixation on individualism that is entirely alien, and thus unacceptable, to non-Western cultures. I agree that notions of what is "human" can differ on the grounds of culture, but taking the position of cultural relativism to its extreme would mean that there is no ground for a common notion of humanity whatsoever. In the end, this position can only be upheld if one denies an undeniable fact; that the potential to reason, judge, and choose is a universally human potential. To argue otherwise would be the same as stating that the potential to reason, judge, and choose is uniquely Western and does not apply to people having grown up under the imprint of Confucian,

Islamic or other non-Western traditions. This is an obviously absurd position as it divides humankind into different species on the basis of cultural differences. Hence, I insist that the potential to make autonomous judgments and to pursue self-chosen preferences is universally human, not culture-specific. What differs on the grounds of culture is how much room is given to the human potential for choice; the potential itself, however, is culturally invariant.


To pursue self-chosen priorities is not only a universal potential of the human species. It is also a universal human desire, reflected in higher life satisfaction when given room to realize it. This position is supported by ample evidence from cross-cultural psychology showing that people whose activities are driven by intrinsic motivations (which means they act according to self-chosen preferences), have increased feelings of fulfillment, subjective well-being, and general life satisfaction, *irrespective* of diversity in cultural backgrounds. “Autonomy, “agency” and “self-actualization” are universal psychological needs that diminish life satisfaction when unsatisfied (Ryan and Deci 2001). Even people in “collectivist” cultures systematically report lower levels of life satisfaction when they feel they have little choice in determining how their life turns out.

Evidence from the World Values Surveys illustrates the universality of the connection between perceived freedom of choice and life satisfaction. Thus, the individual-level linkage between life satisfaction and people’s perception of choice is present throughout all cultural zones.² Figure 1 presents the correlation between these two survey questions across 74 nations in nine distinct cultural regions. The correlations are consistently positive. There is nothing uniquely Western in the fact that more freedom of choice tends to create higher levels of life satisfaction.

Unquestionably, philosophers from Plato to Hobbes to Elias saw a quintessential characteristic of culture in its taming function; that is, its tendency to constrain people’s striving for autonomy, self-direction, and choice by instilling in them ideals of social conformity. However, this taming function is by no means invariant. Instead, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) show, cultures are much more “successful” in taming people’s strive for self-direction under pressing existential conditions. Existential pressures make people mentally more prepared to accept the priority of group discipline and authority over individual autonomy and choice. It is a systematic finding that conformity values tend to dominate in societies

² The analyses underlying Figure 1 are based on data from the World Values Surveys. Information on the full set of nations in the World Values Survey is available from the project website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

Figure 1
Life Satisfaction and the Perception of Choice and Autonomy



Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005:140).

with more pressing existential conditions, whereas emancipative values that emphasize human self-expression tend to prevail in societies with more comfortable and permissive existential conditions (Welzel *et al.* 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As I will argue, how pressing or permissive existential conditions are is not only a matter of material wealth; it is also a matter of education levels and social networking opportunities.

Centering the concept of human development on self-generated choices is equivalent to defining human development as “people empowerment,” where people empowerment means diminishing constraints on people’s potential to direct their lives themselves. People empowerment, in this sense, is a matter of the social conditions in which people live. As depicted in Table 1, these conditions are relevant in three aspects: economic, cultural, and institutional. Thus, people empowerment involves at least three things. First, people must be *enabled* to pursue self-chosen preferences. This is a matter of their socioeconomic conditions, which do or do not

Table 1
The Human Development of Societies

Human development ...	SOCIOECONOMIC Dimension	CULTURAL Dimension	INSTITUTIONAL Dimension
... takes place when:	growing Civic Resources extend people's action repertoires	rising Emancipative Values enhance people's action motivations	expanding Democratic Liberties widen people's action rights
... determines:	The extent to which people are a b l e w i l l i n g a l l o w e d to pursue self-chosen priorities		
... enlarges people's:	Capabilities of	Aspirations for	Entitlements to
... means in short:	P e o p l e E m p o w e r m e n t (diminishing constraints on intrinsic human choice)		

Source: Adapted from Welzel (2002:46).

give people the means needed to pursue self-chosen preferences. Second, people must feel *encouraged* to pursue self-chosen preferences, making them feel free from pressures to group conformity. This is a matter of people's cultural environment, which does or does not support the values stimulating people to pursue their own choices in life. Third, people must be *allowed* to pursue their own choices in both private and public affairs. This is a matter of people's institutional context, which does or does not give them rights entitling them to make autonomous choices. Thus, people empowerment operates on the level of people's *capabilities*, *motivations*, and *entitlements* to set their own goals in life and pursue self-chosen priorities.

Empowerment through Capabilities: The Role of Civic Resources

People's capabilities to pursue self-chosen activities depend critically on available resources that people can access and use according to their choice. There are three types of resources involved: (1) material means, (2) intellectual skills, and (3) networking opportunities. Each of these types of resource increases people's action repertoire in manifold ways. The expanded action repertoire also includes "civic" actions that people undertake jointly with others, which is noteworthy as such civic actions are the quintessential means to hold decision makers responsible for what people want out of life. Because of their common potential for civic

action, I summarize people's material, intellectual, and social resources under the term "civic resources."

Modernization is linked with an increase in material, intellectual, and social resources. Through technology-driven productivity growth, economic development increases and diversifies people's supply of goods and services and raises their financial incomes, making them able to invest the time, money, and equipment needed for many activities, both private and civic. All these kinds of material resources make people means-wise more capable.

Furthermore, modernization is linked with rising levels of education, more easily available information, and a mobilization of human intellect by its tendency to widen knowledge-intensive economic and cultural activities. All this increases people's intellectual skills, making them cognitively more capable to invent and undertake human activities.

Finally, modernization tends to produce denser, more diversified, and more widely networked populations, offering people a greater variety of possible connections to other people. More networking opportunities lower people's existential dependence on strong, but few, in-group ties, allowing individuals to choose between diverse affiliations to other people, groups of people, or voluntary associations (Granovetter 1973). Networking opportunities empower people connection-wise, making them socially more capable to initiate and join activities with others.

To obtain a summary indicator of civic resources combining material, intellectual, and social resources, I use Vanhanen's (1997) index of "power resources." This index combines the level and distribution of (1) material resources (share of family farms in the agrarian sector weighed for this sector's contribution to GDP, combined with estimates of the deconcentration of non-agrarian economic resources), (2) intellectual resources (literacy rate combined with tertiary enrollment ratios), and (3) a measure of social complexity (estimates of occupational differentiation combined with urbanization rates). I suppose the latter to indicate the diversity and electivity in people's social connections.

All in all, modernization increases and diversifies people's civic resources, including their material means, intellectual skills, and social opportunities. This makes people more capable to follow their own preferences and pursue self-chosen activities. Human development will be off base without the *enabling effect* of civic resources.³

³ The index yields values of maximum 100. For more details see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at "<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevlopment.html>," under "Variables" (#08).


Empowerment through Motivations: The Role of Emancipative Values

People empowerment has a mentality component as well. To become a widespread practice in social life, human choice needs not only people who are able to pursue self-chosen activities, but also people who are willing to do so. This is a matter of motivations, which are most powerful if they are intrinsic, based on internalized values and ideals.

People internalize value orientations mostly through the subconscious mechanisms of socialization. Socialization allows cultures to reproduce themselves, passing on the values that are constitutive for their identity from one generation to the next. Value systems that place emphasis on collective conformity, and thus discourage people to pursue self-chosen preferences, can and do survive, even though these value systems systematically produce lower life satisfaction. The striving for self-direction is innate to human nature, but this does not mean that it cannot be discouraged by a culture's prevailing value system and mental climate.

Conformist value systems place collective discipline over individual autonomy. Doing so, they discourage any activity that would set an individual too much apart from its related group. By contrast, emancipative values emphasize human self-expression; they encourage people to pursue self-chosen preferences, even if this diminishes group conformity. Actually, group conformity is not seen as a value in itself when emancipative ideals gain momentum. Quite the contrary, the opposite of group conformity – human diversity – becomes increasingly seen as an enrichment of social experience. Again, these insights are well anchored in cross-cultural psychology, which has long emphasized the difference between “collectivist” and “individualist” cultures (Hofstede 2001; Triandis 1995; Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996; Schwartz 2003).

I prefer the term “emancipative” to “individualist” because “individualism” is too easily confused with selfishness and egoism, obscuring the fact that individualism goes more easily together with humanism than do collectivism/conformism (which usually combine in-group favoritism with out-group discrimination). In fact, emancipative values mean a universal appreciation of human autonomy in general, including *other* people's autonomy, leading to greater tolerance of non-conformity. Emancipative values involve a universal notion of human freedom in general, rather than a selfish emphasis on one's own freedom alone. Also, emancipative values are not anti-collective in the sense that they withhold people from initiating and joining civic actions with other people. On the contrary, emancipative values actually encourage people to initiate and join various new types of contentious but peaceful civic activities that keep



power holders responsive to the public. These activities have an inherently elite-challenging nature (Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005).

Emancipative values are not a constant cultural trait of societies. Instead, societies move towards more emancipative values when existential conditions become more permissive, giving the human strive for choice more room. This happens even in societies in which conformist values have a long tradition. Today, we observe a generational shift to emancipative values in all affluent post-industrial societies, including Confucian societies such as Japan and South Korea. The value change towards more emancipative ideals is observed in all societies in which sustained economic development provides the civic resources needed to diminish objective constraints on people's intrinsic life choices.

Emancipative values become more widespread only where existential pressures on human autonomy recede. We do not yet observe pronounced generational differences in emancipative values in China and Vietnam, where the civic resources nurturing these values are still in short supply for huge parts of the population (which, in the case of China, will change in the foreseeable future if economic growth continues as it has done in the last twenty years). By the same token, generational differences in emphasis on emancipative ideals did emerge in Taiwan and South Korea, two countries that have been on a growth path for a much longer time than China and Vietnam, and which, precisely for this reason, have

more widespread civic resources. Thus, cultural traditions are not like an immutable genetic heritage that makes societies immune to the emancipation-minded effects of growing civic resources.

Based on World Values Surveys data, I use an index of emancipative values involving questions that tap civil and political freedom, political expression, and a valuation of human diversity, other people and subjective well-being. Taken together, these values share a common emphasis on the ideal of a human being who is free in life choices and equal in this freedom. The particular components of the emancipative values syndrome include (factor loadings on common dimension in brackets):⁴

- a valuation of civil and political freedom, reflected in liberty aspirations (.87);
- a valuation of political expression, reflected in participation in petitions (.84);
- a valuation of non-conformity, reflected in an acceptance of homosexuality (.78);
- a valuation of the life one lives, reflected in general life satisfaction (.82);
- a valuation of people in general, reflected in interpersonal trust (.61).

Rising emancipative ideals are the central cultural force in the process of human development, motivating people to set their own priorities, define their preferred way of living, pursue self-chosen activities, and join forces with others to struggle for the rights to do so. Human development will be incomplete in the absence of the *motivating effect* of emancipative values.

Empowerment through Entitlements: The Role of Democratic Liberties

Human empowerment not only requires people to be capable and willing to pursue self-chosen preferences. People must also be *allowed* to do so. This is a matter of rights, as only rights can entitle people to pursue their own choices. In complex modern societies, freedom of choice has

⁴ The index is created in such a way that it can be interpreted as the percentage of people emphasizing emancipative values. For additional information on measurement and scaling details, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevlopment.html>, under “Variables” (#49).

both an inward-directed and an outward-directed aspect. *Inward* freedom (“negative” freedom) protects individuals from interventions into their private decision-making freedom in such areas as the choice of occupation, residence, partner, religious beliefs, leisure time activities or sexual orientation. The shielding aspect of inward freedom is guaranteed by specifically *civil* rights.

However, civil rights do not suffice to provide freedom of choice in societies in which major aspects of people’s daily lives are subject to political regulations. Hence, entitling people to influence political matters that affect their lives requires rights as well. In this case, we talk about *political* rights. Like civil rights, political rights are individual rights in the sense that their practice is left to individuals, not groups. Political rights include the right to associate with others, to found interest associations or political parties, the right to initiate and join public actions such as boycotts, petitions or demonstrations, the right to sue officials, the right to access administrative information, and the right to vote in elections and referenda. These rights safeguard *outward* freedom (“positive” freedom), which does not shield people inwardly from the state; it gives them opportunities to reach outward in influencing and direct state activities (Rose 1995). Inward freedom and outward freedom become manifest in civil and political rights. Taken together, these rights constitute democratic liberties, that is, liberties for the people.

To make democratic liberties practicable, these liberties must not only be legally codified in the form of rights; elites must also be so honest as to supply these liberties in ways that do not corrupt them (Finer 1999; Rose 2001). Thus, honest governance (i.e., the absence of corrupt governance) interacts with the legal supply of democratic liberties to produce *uncorrupted* or *honest democracy*. Uncorrupted governance is an important supply-side condition to make given democratic liberties practicable for the people. The sheer legal codification of democratic liberties does not guarantee people any real freedom if power holders are not committed to the principles of honest government. Hence, my concern is with *honest* democracy, not with raw measures of democracy that ignore fundamental aspects of the quality of democracy.

By definition, corruption means a dishonest use of public power for private benefit (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005). Such abuse of power does not only involve violations of formal procedures. More practically, corrupt or dishonest government means financial expropriation of the public and blocking popular control over state power. Thus, corrupt government tends to undermine citizens’ rights, and in extreme cases comes close to disenfranchizing the electorate, even if democratic liberties remain formally untouched. The simple truth is that democracy

cannot take effect in rogue states in which the use of public power is corrupted and serves the unchecked rent-seeking interests of office holders. One can even say that each additional unit of corrupt government is one step further towards disempowering ordinary people. Since the empowerment of people is at the heart of democracy, absence of corrupt government, or honest governance, is a condition in the supply of democratic liberties that is critically relevant to the extent to which democracy can take effect. This justifies a qualification of the honesty of democracy using indicators of corrupt government or its absence.

I measure honest democracy by specifying the interaction between democratic liberties and honest (i.e., uncorrupt) governance, multiplying percentage scores of democracy with fractions from 0 to 1.0 for honest governance (with 1.0 being the maximum honesty score):

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{Democratic Liberties} * & \text{Honest Governance} & = \text{Honest Democracy} \\ \text{(percentages)} & \text{weights from 0 to 1.0} & = \text{weighed percentages} \end{array}$$

Democratic Liberties: civil and political rights scores from Freedom House (inverted scores added and maximum equated with 100).

Honest Governance: control of corruption scores from the World Bank's Good Governance indicators (normalized).⁵

The index of honest democracy has certain noteworthy properties. Because I use measures of honest governance as a weighting factor that varies between 0 (for the most corrupt country) and 1.0 (for the least corrupt country), high scores in honesty cannot compensate for low scores in democracy. Even a maximum honesty score of 1.0 cannot do more than maintain a given raw level of democracy. Put differently, a democracy score can only be downgraded, not upgraded, by a favorable honesty score.

Because honest democracy is democracy with an additional qualification, democratic liberties are necessary, but not sufficient, to produce it. Honest governance, too, is needed to produce honest democracy. In that sense, honest democracy is a more demanding measure than democracy without this qualification, which is exactly the intention behind making the qualification.

Consider the example of Singapore. It has a low democracy score and a high honesty score because the city-state is known for its restrictions


⁵ For a detailed description of these measures, see the website <http://www.worldvalues-survey.org/publications/humandevlopment.html> under "Variables" (#21).

on democratic liberties as well as its uncorrupt government practices. But, as Figure 2 illustrates, Singapore's favorable honesty score cannot compensate for its low democracy score, so the city-state's score in honest democracy is as low as its raw score in democracy (even somewhat lower because there is no perfectly honest governance). Thus, a country can show a low score in honest democracy for two different reasons; either its democracy score is low, or its honesty score is low. This property of the index is fully intentional; whether citizens cannot practice democratic liberties because these liberties are not instituted, or whether they are hindered to practice them because dishonest government renders these liberties impracticable, is entirely irrelevant to the fact that citizens in both cases are not in the situation to practice their liberties. This is exactly what is crucial for honest democracy. Conversely, a society must achieve both a high democracy score and a high honesty score to achieve a high score in honest democracy.

As Figure 2 shows, Singapore reaches the 33rd percentile in its raw democracy score, as compared to the 10th percentile for China. This reflects that civil and political liberties in Singapore are not as rigidly restricted as they are in China, for which reason Singapore is rated by Freedom House as "partly free" and China as "not free." On the other hand, Singapore is rated only *partly* free, not entirely free, because it imposes considerable restrictions on democratic liberties. Still, because of its very high honesty score, its low raw score for democracy is translated almost undiminished into its score for honest democracy. Nevertheless, Singapore's score for honest democracy remains low because a low democracy score cannot be compensated.

Bolivia, on the other hand, ranks much higher in raw democracy than Singapore. This is perfectly appropriate as Bolivia indeed has much wider democratic liberties than Singapore. Yet, a very low score in honest governance dramatically downgrades the score for honest democracy, rendering Bolivia's democratic liberties largely irrelevant. The reality behind this is very well reflected in all five indicators of "good governance" provided by the World Bank. For example, political violence, terror, and patronage are so pervasive in Bolivia that the liberties the constitution assigns to its citizens are hardly practicable. To be sure, Bolivia has institutionalized much wider democratic liberties than Singapore, for which reason Bolivia ranks much higher in raw democracy (and rightly so). But the Singaporeans' fewer liberties are less corrupted by dishonest governance practices than the Bolivians' wider liberties. In the end, Bolivia's score in honest democracy falls even below the low score of Singapore. These differences in honest democracy are highly indicative of the citizens "real" liberties.

Figure 3
The Triangular Nexus of Human Development



Note:
Numbers on bidirectional arrows are correlation coefficients (r). Numbers on one-directional arrows are factor loadings on common underlying dimension. $N = 74$.

Uncorrupted democratic liberties operate on the level of entitlements, empowering people legally to pursue self-chosen activities. From this perspective, democracy is the institutional setting most suited to the human potential for choice and self-direction. Hence, the significance of democratization lies in the fact that it contributes the institutional component to human development. It is thus one of three major contributions to human development and should be considered in this broader context. Human development will be incomplete without the *entitling effect* of democratic liberties.

The Triangular Nexus

Conceptually, civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties belong together as each of these components makes a distinctive contribution to a common underlying theme: human empowerment. But these three components are not only logically linked. Empirically, too, these components are closely tied to each other. In fact, civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties converge in a robust and coherent dimension, which a factor analysis clearly demonstrates. As Figure 3 depicts, across a global sample of 74 nations for which measures of all three variables are available, there is a 92-percent overlapping variance between national levels of civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties, with each of the three components showing a .96 loading on their common underlying factor, human development (to see which 74 nations exactly are included in this analysis, see Figure 4 or 5 below).

How do the linkages between the three components of human development operate? I argue that emancipative values gain momentum in societies to the extent to which societal constraints on people's intrinsic choices recede, which happens when growing civic resources make people materially, cognitively, and socially more capable to pursue self-chosen activities. Increasing capabilities of action nurture a basic sense of human agency. This leads people to question unlimited authority, makes them receptive to the idea of civil and political liberties, and finally makes them ready to struggle for the rights that effectively guarantee these liberties.

Evidence in History

The human development nexus between civic resources, emancipative ideals, and democratic liberties is evident throughout history. Even though democratic liberties have never been granted in a fully inclusive form in pre-industrial times, it nevertheless holds true that whenever these liberties became effective for at least significant parts of the population it happened because these parts of the population disposed of the civic resources enabling them to struggle for civil and political liberties, and because they have been inspired by the emancipative ideals motivating them to struggle for these liberties. Because rulers give away part of their powers by granting liberties to considerable parts of the public, they have not usually been very keen to do this, unless the public had the means and the will to enforce these liberties, which is only the case when civic resources and emancipative ideals are relatively widespread.

The history of pre-industrial societies is full of hunger revolts in which exploited peasants spontaneously rebelled from time to time against the most pressing hardship. In none of these revolts, however, did people come up with a program to implement civil and political rights that empower the people. The entire idea of rights, be it property rights or voting rights, was alien to exploited peasant populations in despotic agrarian empires from Eastern Europe to the Middle East to India to China. Instead, the idea of civil and political rights was born in free farmer societies in ancient Athens and the Roman Republic; it was re-invented by free farmer societies and merchant republics in late medieval Europe, most notably in Northern Italy, the Lowlands, Switzerland, Iceland, England and Scandinavia, and expanded to establish early limited forms of democracy in the era of pre-industrial capitalism through the liberal revolutions in Northwestern Europe and its offshoots in Northern America and Oceania, enacting principles such as "no taxation without representation" (Dahl 1973; McNeill 1990; Finer 1999).

Without question, the liberal revolutions established only limited versions of democracy, none of which qualifies as a democracy under contemporary standards, for the entitlement to civil and political liberties was far from being fully inclusive. But the first and foremost step was made with the very definition of these liberties, committing governments for the first time since classical Athens to the well-being of the people, even if the people were not yet defined comprehensively. It is significant that the implementation of democratic liberties, however limited, has been pioneered by capitalist freeholder societies whose members experienced a significant degree of existential autonomy. Such autonomy nurtures a basic sense of human agency, making people more critical towards unlimited and uncontrolled authority, more receptive to the idea of civil and political rights and more ready to struggle for them in case they are in short supply. These popular struggles characterize social movements from the liberal revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries to the people demonstrations of Third Wave in the late 20th century. These popular struggles are at the very heart of democratization.

Achieving democratization by popular struggles is only possible if people have the means and will to enforce democratic liberties on their rulers. Again, this is only the case when civic resources and emancipative ideals are relatively widespread among the people.

People-Driven and Non-People-Driven Democratization

Of course, it is perfectly possible that rulers install democratic liberties even if most of the population is neither capable nor willing to enforce these liberties. This can happen for various reasons. There can be the rare case of benevolent rulers who unaffectedly install democratic liberties. Commitments of this kind are most likely rooted in historical bonds to a model country of democracy, bonds that make rulers feel obligated to democratic norms. The adoption of democracy at the start of India's national independence in 1947 might be the most obvious case in point. Alternatively, rulers might enact democratic liberties because they have learnt from disastrous recent experiences with non-democratic forms of government, so that democracy appears to be the only viable alternative left; democratization in Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan after World War II might partly fall into that category. "Enlightened democratization" in that sense is the only case in which honest democracy is the outcome even if there is little effective pressure by the population to realize honest democracy. However, this case is as rare as the species of benevolent dictators.

A second, more likely possibility that rulers will install democracy in

the absence of population pressures is when these rulers are depending on the will of external powers that are strongly pressing for democratization. This case of “external democratization” is typical of post-war democracies such as West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan after World War II. The overriding power of the U.S. left these countries’ post-war leaders no other viable option than democracy. The U.S.-led attempts to install democracy in post-war Afghanistan and Iraq fall into the same category of externally guided democratization.

A third and increasingly widespread possibility that rulers will install democracy without being pressed to do so by their own population is when rulers believe that they can effectively corrupt democratic liberties in practice, and when the pretense of democracy seems to be a useful means to open the doors to the international community, especially donor organizations. This case of “opportunistic democratization” has become more likely since the Washington Consensus, after which Western credits have been tied to conditions of “good governance.”

Enlightened democratization, external democratization, and opportunistic democratization are all cases of democratization in which the elites install democratic liberties even though they are not forced to do so by popular pressures. This is so because the population in these cases has neither the means making it capable, nor the motivations making it willing, to launch democratization pressure. If this is so, the population also has little of the means and will to practice given democratic liberties effectively. The most likely result of this is corrupted democracy because, in a population largely incapable and discouraged to enforce democratic liberties, the rent-seeking interests of power holders can unfold largely unchecked. Thus, corrupted democracy is most likely in the absence of the enabling and motivating aspects of human development on the side of the people. In fact, there are indications that various forms of corrupted democracy are going to replace open dictatorship as the modal type of regime when the enabling and motivating aspects of human development have not yet reached the people. By the same token, the emergence of honest democracy is still an elite-side step in human development that is closely tied to the enabling and motivating steps on the side of the people.

If growing civic resources make people more capable, and rising emancipative values make them more willing to practice democratic liberties, it becomes increasingly likely that these people initiate and join social movements that demand and struggle for greater and less corrupted democratic liberties. In a democracy, this will result in social pressures to widen already existing liberties or to reduce abusing practices of them. In an authoritarian system, such liberation movements challenge the

whole political regime itself because the enactment of civil and political liberties puts an end to authoritarian rule. This makes liberation movements a risky adventure. Authoritarian elites may decide at any point to terminate such a movement by force, as happened in 1989 in China.

But suppression is not an unlimited option. Quite the contrary; confronted with a public whose members are capable and motivated to initiate and join widespread mass actions, the coercive option is likely to fail. Democracy movements can only be suppressed by military means if they are concentrated on a few places and limited to isolated groups of the population. Such was the case when members of the thin student population initiated pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989. However, when mass demonstrations spread all over the country, involving various groups of the population, as was true in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states, military suppression becomes almost impossible. This is not to say that coercive regimes cannot survive when they have lost the support of the population. The sad truth is that they can – but only as long as the population does not dispose of the resources, and is not inspired by the ideals that enable and stimulate it to launch a mass liberation movement. Once, however, civic resources and emancipative ideals become widespread, no coercive regime can survive for long time (except when it is externally supported by a non-democratic empire).

Experiencing Autonomy

Economic development helps give rise to emancipative values because it provides a basic sense of human agency, on the basis of which emancipative goals enter the realm of the possible. This is so because economic development increases individually accessible resources, including material means, intellectual skills, and social opportunities, all of which widen people's action repertoire, giving them a sense of autonomy and agency. Sometimes, however, economic development can be suspiciously one-sided, as is the case in oil-exporting countries, which are super-rich, but otherwise very traditional.

Oil-exporting economies do not nurture the sense of autonomy that gives rise to emancipative values in post-industrial knowledge economies. This is an important illustration of the fact that sheer material wealth alone does little to provide a sense of human autonomy, unless it is accompanied by high levels of education (which make people intellectually more autonomous) and highly elective patterns of connectivity (which make them socially more autonomous). The activities needed to sustain a rent-seeking economy require little intellectual skills and little

electivity in people's social networks. A rent-seeking economy can become rich while keeping people on a low level of skills and locked in closely-knit social groups. This emphasizes that the nature of a society's prevailing economic activities plays a decisive role in determining whether higher cognitive skills and more elective social connections are favored. Only in combination with these factors does economic development nurture a basic sense of human autonomy.

If major economic activities require individual creativity and initiative, they nurture a sense of individual competence, mastery, and autonomy. If they involve rather standardized routine work, they undermine this sense of agency. Thus, Nolan and Lenski (1999) provide evidence that people in hunter-gatherer societies had more individualistic values than people who grew up in the "labor-repressive" agrarian empires. On the scale of emancipative values, hunter-gatherer societies would probably score higher than agrarian empires. It is no coincidence that hunter-gatherer societies have been relatively democratic, whereas the hallmark of agrarian empires was despotism (Ember, Ember and Russett 1997).

By contrast, whenever civil and political liberties have been institutionalized in pre-industrial times, it was in free farmer societies or free merchant republics in which private property on land and free access to markets gave people some degree of existential autonomy, even if they were not affluent. These societies have neither been rich, nor have their people been existentially secure by current standards; nevertheless, it was in exactly these societies that the philosophies of Humanism and Enlightenment established an emancipative ethos. Again, it is no coincidence that free farmer and merchant societies in Western Europe and Northern America were the cradle of modern liberal democracy. The meritocratic middle classes in these societies have been the strongest proponents of the civil and political liberties that define democracy until today.

Industrialization did not strengthen this emancipative ethos, and the working class was not the most powerful social force in pushing for democracy, contrary to what Rueschemeyer *et al.* (1992) suggest. The working class demanded a welfare state and universal suffrage, but often enough at the expense of civil and political liberties. Quite frequently, the working class helped in voting fascist, communist, and populist parties into office. Once in power, these parties restricted civil and political liberties or nullified them altogether. In any case, the working class did not place special emphasis on civil and political liberties, in line with what Lipset (1959) once described as "working class authoritarianism." Thus, the rise and expansion of the working class did not bring or strengthen emancipative ideals.


The daily work performed by the typical blue-collar worker of the industrial age was standardized manual routines, nothing that nurtures human creativity and independent thinking. The Fordist organization of economic and social life in industrial societies, with their gigantic factories, huge bureaucracies, uniform social classes and prefixed role models, has been rigidly standardized. People hardly experienced themselves as autonomous individuals in this standardized world. Even though the mechanical worldview of the industrial age gave rise to secular-rational values, it did not support emancipative values to the same extent. Uncoupled from emancipative values, the secular-rational worldview was perfectly compatible with communist, fascist and other forms of totalitarian ideologies. Although it is true that industrialization brought universal suffrage and mass involvement into politics, mass political involvement was as often realized in authoritarian forms as it was in democratic forms.

The post-industrial age brings another turn as the rise of knowledge-intensive economies changes the nature of economic activities. Tasks in knowledge-intensive professions become more cognition-based and involve more intellectual creativity, which offers a wider scope for individual judgment and thinking. The change in the nature of economic activities goes along with more flexible ways in which the whole society is organized, de-standardizing social classes, social roles, career patterns and life courses, making group affiliations, role models and biographies a more elective matter of people's own choices. Individualization (Beck 2002) in that sense does not mean the destruction or reduction of people's connectivity, but more individual freedom to connect and disconnect as they choose, making social networks more diverse, flexible, modular, and elective. This individualization trend nourishes a sense of autonomy and life control and an emancipative ethos that brings social pressures to widen and deepen civil and political rights and equal opportunities, including consumer rights, women's rights, children's rights, the rights of gays and lesbians, freedom of information rights, as well as increasing pressures on elites to govern transparently, accountably, and responsively. Rising emancipative values are the central motivational force in this process, helping to make societies ever more people-centered. Table 2 summarizes these arguments.

Raw Democracy and Honest Democracy

Their common focus on intrinsic human choice intertwines civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties to a remarkable extent. To illustrate this point, Figure 4 displays the relationship between the spread of civic resources and emancipative values among national populations,

Table 2
Democratization as an Outcome of Human Development Process



both measured in the early 1990s and mid 1990s respectively.⁶ Knowing how widespread civic resources are in a society, we can explain 80 percent of the cross-national variance in emancipative values.

⁶ A dating of the exact year of the measurement is not possible as the measures vary by four to five years from country to country. On average, the year of measurement is 1993 for both civic resources and emancipative values.

Figure 4
Civic Resources and Emancipative Values





Figure 5 displays the relationship between the spread of emancipative values in the early 1990s and varying degrees of honest democracy⁷ in 2002-04. Knowing how widespread emancipative values are in a population, we can explain 79 percent of the cross-national variation in the presence of honest democracy.

To the effective practice of democracy, honest democracy is a much more meaningful measure than democracy without this additional qualification. From this perspective, it is noteworthy that my measure of

⁷ Our measure of effective democracy combines the formal presence of civil and political rights and the elites' respect of rule of law ("elite integrity") in such a way that high scores in elite integrity cannot do more than simply reproduce a given level of civil and political rights (measured in percentiles of the possible maximum), whereas low scores in elite integrity can seriously downgrade a given level of civil and political rights. For measurement details, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevlopment.html>, under "Variables" (#21).

Figure 5
Emancipative Values and Democratic Liberties



honest democracy is much more closely associated with emancipative mass values than are standard measures of democracy which do not take honest governance into account. After all, this is perfectly logical in the human development perspective; the liberating social forces that can release effective social pressures on elites to respect democratic liberties are only present to the extent to which a public disposes of the resources enabling it, and to the extent to which it is inspired by the ideals motivating it to struggle for democratic liberties.

Effect Thresholds

The links between societal levels of civic resources and emancipative values, and between emancipative values and democratic liberties, are systematic and linear. Yet, even strongly linear relationships such as these are not perfectly deterministic. Nations are not positioned on a straight line. Rather, they are scattered along distinct but relatively broad corridors (i.e., confidence intervals), as depicted by the left and right dotted boundaries in Figures 4 and 5.

These corridors reflect thresholds in the effects of resources on values and of values on liberties, implying that not every one-unit increase in civic resources is reflected in a corresponding increase in emancipative values, and that not every one-unit increase in emancipative values is reflected in a corresponding increase in democratic liberties. The size of the increase in civic resources needed to make corresponding increases in emancipative values very likely (say to 95 percent likely), as well as the size of the increase in emancipative values required to make corresponding increases in democratic liberties very likely, is relatively large. Generally speaking, we deal with the increase in an independent variable X needed to yield a corresponding increase in a dependent variable Y , which I call the “effect threshold” of X on Y . In the present case, the size of the effect threshold is depicted by the horizontal widths of the corridors, demarcated by the dotted lines in Figures 4 and 5. Since relationships in the social and political world are never strictly deterministic, the existence of effect thresholds is what we usually expect.

Consider Figure 4 again. If one starts moving from any point at the left boundary to the right, that is, along increasing civic resources, it is not very likely that the next society one encounters scores higher in emancipative values than the previous one, *unless* one’s move exceeds a horizontal distance as large as the width of the whole corridor. Exceeding this distance, it becomes almost certain that the next society with more widespread civic resources than the previous one also has more widespread emancipative values than the previous one. The same applies to Figure 5. As one moves from less to more widespread emancipative values, starting at any point on the left boundary of the corridor, the next society is not very likely to have wider democratic liberties than the previous one—as long as one’s move does not cross the right boundary of the corridor. But, if one crosses this boundary, it is virtually guaranteed that the next society with more widespread emancipative values than the previous one also has wider democratic liberties.

The effect thresholds are rather large—so large indeed that the effects become fully apparent only when taking the entire global variation into account. In contrast, most geographical regions are internally so coherent that the variation among their nations hardly overcomes the threshold of the effects of resources on values and of values on liberties. This is noteworthy as it clarifies that the linkages constituting human development can be easily overlooked from too narrow a perspective.

The human development nexus becomes fully apparent only when large-scale variation of a global scope is taken into account. As a consequence, the nexus is not very evident at the individual level within nations. For example, the individual-level link between civic resources

and emancipative values is, in general, relatively weak and, in some national samples, even insignificant. Pooled across all national samples, however, the individual-level link between civic resources and emancipative values is highly significant, with civic resources showing a .22 beta-effect on emancipative values, which is considerably strong given the large random error in individual-level mass data.⁸ Thus, the effect becomes apparent only if the large-scale variation between nations is taken into account.

This is very indicative of the nature of the effect of civic resources on emancipative values. The fact that this effect is weak, and sometimes even invisible, among individuals within the same nation shows that individuals do not internalize stronger emancipative ideals because they command more civic resources than most other individuals in their society. Instead, individuals internalize stronger emancipative ideals when the general level of civic resources is high; that is, when not only they themselves, but when most individuals in their nation, dispose of many civic resources. This is obvious from the fact that civic resources do show a relatively strong individual-level effect on emancipative values in the pooled dataset when the full between-nation variation is taken into account. Accordingly, the national average of civic resources determines an individual's emancipative values more than this individual's own civic resources. This implies that the effect of resources on values is mostly contextual or ecological by nature.⁹

It is for this reason that the same relation between civic resources and emancipative values is even stronger at the aggregate level when one uses national averages of civic resources and emancipative values (in this case there is an effect of $\beta = .89$). By aggregating individual-level data to the nation level, one reduces the existing variance solely to its between-nation component. As we have seen, this component of the variance is more significant than the variation among individuals within nations, which is indeed largely contaminated with random measurement error. Aggregation eliminates random measurement error at the individual level because negative and positive deviations from a given mean cancel each other out when averaging them. Hence, the pooled

⁸ To calculate this correlation, a variable combining an individual's level of formal education (measured on a nine-point ordinal scale from no education to university-level education) and its income level (measured in national currency deciles of available household income) has been constructed. For the magnitude of the correlation it doesn't matter if one uses an additive or multiplicative combination of education and income.

⁹ Welzel (2003) has shown this using more sophisticated multi-level models.

individual-level relation between civic resources and emancipative values is much weaker than the aggregate-level relation between the same two variables. This, however, does not invalidate the aggregate-level relation. It only shows how much random noise there is on the individual level.

Intrinsic and Instrumental Support for Democracy

The societal-level relation between emancipative values and democratic liberties does not have an individual-level equivalent. Democratic liberties are a system property that does not vary at the individual level. However, one might suppose that the effect of emancipative values on democratic liberties exists because, and only because, widespread emancipative values produce mass support for democracy. Thus, aggregate measures of explicit support for democracy should have an even more direct effect on democratic liberties than have emancipative values. Surprising as it may seem, this is *not* the case.

When one calculates the percentage of people in a country who express strong support for democracy,¹⁰ this variable explains only 32 percent of the variation in democratic liberties over 74 nations in the World Values Survey. By contrast, the national levels of emancipative values explain 79 percent of the variation in democratic liberties, even though none of the components of these values refers explicitly to democracy itself. Adding explicit support of democracy to emancipative values as an explanatory factor increases the explained variance by only five percent, with explicit democratic support showing a much weaker and less significant effect

¹⁰ Following Klingemann (1999), I create an “autocracy-democracy preference” index as follows: I first sum up the extent to which a respondent endorses the statements, “Having a democratic political system” (V166 in WVS III-IV) and “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” (V172). Approval of these statements can be expressed in four categories: “very good” (recoded 3), “fairly good” (recoded 2), “fairly bad” (coded 1) and “very bad” (coded 0) for the former statement, and “agree strongly” (coded 3), “agree” (coded 2), “disagree” (coded 1) and “disagree strongly” (coded 0) for the latter. Thus, support for these statements adds up to produce a scale from 0 to 6, with 6 representing the highest support for democracy. In the second step, I sum up people’s agreement that “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” (V164) and “Having the army rule” (V165) would be a good way to run this country. This also creates a 0-to-6 scale, measuring support for authoritarian forms of government. I then subtract support for authoritarian rule from support for democracy, yielding an index from -6 (maximum support for autocracy) to +6 (maximum support for democracy). Finally, I calculate for each sample the percentage scoring at least +4 on this -6 to +6 index, classifying those respondents as “strong” overt supporters of democracy.

than emancipative values.¹¹ Hence, the effect of emancipative values on democratic liberties does not operate by producing more people who express overt support of democracy.

This is all the more noteworthy as I use an elaborated indicator of support for democracy that balances people's support of democracy against their support of authoritarian alternatives to democracy, such as military rule. This indicator measures net support for democracy, which is not inflated by people who react favorably on the term democracy without rejecting other political systems. This finding directs attention to the relationship between emancipative values and support for democracy. However, should these two variables not be strongly related because democracy is the natural system preferred by people who emphasize human emancipation?

Indeed, there is a positive relationship between emancipative values and support for democracy. At the aggregate-level, the national level of emancipative values correlates at .53 with percentages expressing strong overt support for democracy ($N = 71$). Pooled across all samples, the individuals' emphasis on emancipative values correlates with their support for democracy at .26. These correlations are highly significant and point in the expected direction. But they are weaker than one might suspect. Why is this the case?

As Welzel (2006) demonstrates, the relation between emancipative values and support for democracy exists at the societal level because societies having relatively large numbers of people who emphasize emancipative values (that is, above 45%) always produce a majority of people who explicitly support democracy. Thus, relatively widespread emancipative values are a sufficient condition to produce majorities of overt democrats. What weakens the relation, however, is that it does not hold in the reverse direction. Among societies with low proportions of people emphasizing emancipative values, the proportion of overt supporters of democracy is not necessarily low. Among societies with low levels of emancipative values, one can find a wide range of overt support for democracy from a low of almost zero percent in Vietnam, to a high of roughly 80 percent in Bangladesh. Hence, emancipative values are a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for producing majorities of overt supporters of democracy.

Why this is so becomes obvious when one examines the attitudinal predictors of support for democracy at the individual level. Emancipative

¹¹ More precise regression results are found in Welzel and Inglehart (forthcoming).


values are a significant individual-level predictor of overt support for democracy because emancipation minded people have an intrinsic tendency to endorse the civil and political liberties that define democracy. People who support democracy on the basis of emancipative values support it because of its inherent liberating qualities, not as a means to other ends. This is what I call “intrinsic” support. Yet, many people with weak emancipative orientations also support democracy, but for other reasons. This is obvious from the – namely how good they think democracies are at maintaining order and managing a prospering economy – is an even better predictor of support of democracy than are emancipative values. This sort of support is detached from an intrinsic valuation of democracy’s inherent qualities. It derives from performance expectations. Thus, democracy is valued as a means to other ends, not an end in itself. This is what I call “instrumental” support.

The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental support is of critical importance. It helps explain why emancipative values are a much more powerful predictor of democratic liberties than is overt support for democracy. Even the most sophisticated measures of overt support for democracy are highly inflated by instrumental support motives. Only to a lesser extent do they measure intrinsic support for democracy. This makes it necessary to split the overt supporters of democracy into intrinsic supporters (i.e., those placing relatively strong emphasis on emancipative values) and instrumental supporters (i.e., those placing relatively little emphasis on emancipative values).

Figure 6 partitions the overall democratic support into its intrinsic and instrumental components.¹² This partition yields highly interesting results. Obviously, overall support of democracy does not differentiate the world very much any more; it has spread around the globe, showing high levels even in Sub-Saharan Africa. But intrinsic support continues to differentiate the world; it has not diffused into all corners of the planet.

¹² Respondents scoring high in support for democracy (4 or higher in the autocracy-democracy preference index described in fn. 9 above) have been divided into (a) those having above-average emancipative values (i.e., scoring above the overall mean in individual-level emancipative values) and (b) those having below-average emancipative values. Group (a) has been classified as intrinsic supporters of democracy, group (b) as instrumental supporters. For each sample, the percentage of both groups has been calculated. Finally, a percentage difference index has been created by subtracting instrumental from intrinsic supporters. For further details on instrumental and intrinsic support of democracy, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevlopment.html>, under “Variables” (#58–60).

Figure 6
Partitioning Support for Democracy into its Instrumental and Intrinsic Components




Instead, intrinsic support for democracy is an exclusive property of regions that are far advanced in human development.

To extend this logic one step further, Figure 7 shows how strongly the *composition* of support of democracy across cultural regions is related to the level of honest democracy. The extent to which intrinsic supporters exceed instrumental supporters places a cultural zone higher in the level of honest democracy. This finding is a highly valid simplification of the same relation among the much larger number of single nations because the few cultural zones in Figure 7 capture fully 85 percent of the entire cross-national variation in democratic liberties and intrinsic versus instrumental support for democracy.

These findings confirm the emphasis that human development theory places on the theme of emancipation. Support for democracy is relevant to real democratic liberties only insofar as it is tied to emancipative ideals. Honest democracy, at least, is essentially an emancipative achievement, which makes it a central aspect of human development.

Figure 7
Effective Democracy and Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Support for Democracy



Conclusion

This article has described democratization as an integral part of a broader process of human development that empowers people. Rising emancipative ideals provide the driving motivational force in this process, and they are not simply a given or absent heritage of cultural tradition. They emerge systematically in the wake of major socioeconomic transformations, all of which have in common that they diminish societal constraints on people's life choices. Societal constraints on human choice recede when growing civic resources make people materially, intellectually, and socially more independent, nurturing a fundamental sense of autonomy and agency that makes people receptive to emancipative ideals, including the idea that having civil and political freedom is a most natural right for people to have, and is worthwhile to struggle for.

Just as the socioeconomic transformations nurturing emancipative ideals can happen in both democratic and non-democratic systems, emancipative ideals, too, can emerge in democratic as well as non-democratic

systems. Thus, there are two ideal-typical pathways through which these ideals promote democratic progress, that is, people empowerment. If emancipative ideals emerge in a non-democracy, the conditions of mobilizing a democracy movement improve because more people have the intrinsic motivation to struggle for democratic liberties. Also, the probability that parts of the younger elite cohorts will be affected by a societal value change to more emancipative ideals increases, making it more likely that a camp of liberal reformers splits off. All this increases the likelihood of adopting democratic liberties where they are not yet in place.

On the other hand, democratic liberties can have been in place for quite some time, such that emancipative ideals become more pronounced in an already democratic setting. In this case, these values fuel various social movement activities, many of which have in common that they struggle for better specified or practiced democratic liberties. These movements are proponents of many of the transformations that Cain, Dalton and Scarrow (2004) portray as a third transformation of democracy, making existing democracies more people-centered. Together, the adoption of democratic liberties where they did not yet exist, and the enrichment of these liberties by more honest practices where they already do exist, constitute democratic progress. Both tracks of progress are an integral part of a broader process of human development in which rising emancipative values provide the central motivational force in fueling people empowerment.

These insights have positive and negative implications. The positive implication is that honest democracy is not an exclusive achievement available only to specific cultures. Instead, it is an integral part of a broader process of human development, and so it can take root everywhere where human development advances. The negative implication is that it indeed needs the development of both people's means and mentalities to anchor honest democracy in a society. True, democratic liberties can be adopted in any society, fully irrespective of people's means and mentalities, but honest democracy which people are able and willing to practice is not. When people lack the abilities and willingness to do so, corrupt democracy is the most likely outcome. Unfortunately, corrupt democracy disempowers people almost as much as open dictatorship. In order to favor honest democracy, one must increase people's capabilities and motivation to take their lives into their own hands. This means to enhance the spread of civic resources and emancipative values. How this is done is a different question, but the key to flourishing democracy lies in these resources and values. Honest democracy is simply not possible without a supportive social environment.

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