

**Development and Democracy:
What We Know about Modernization Today**

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In the last several years, a democratic boom has given way to a democratic recession. Between 1985 and 1995, scores of countries made the transition to democracy, bringing widespread euphoria about democracy's future. But since then, democracy has retreated in Bangladesh, Nigeria, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, and Venezuela, and, and the Bush administration's attempts to establish democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq seem to have left both countries in chaos. These developments, along with the growing power of China and Russia, have led many observers to argue that democracy has reached its high-water mark and is unlikely to expand any farther.

That conclusion is mistaken. The underlying conditions of societies around the world point to a more complicated reality. The bad news is that it is unrealistic to assume that democratic institutions can be set up easily, almost anywhere, at any time. Although the outlook is never hopeless, democracy is likely to emerge and survive only when certain social and cultural conditions are in place. The Bush administration ignored this reality when it attempted to implant democracy in Iraq without first establishing internal security and overlooked cultural conditions that endangered the effort.

The good news, however, is that the conditions conducive to democracy can and do change – and the process of “modernization,” according to abundant empirical evidence, advances them. Modernization is a syndrome of social changes linked with industrialization. Once set in motion, it tends to penetrate all aspects of life, bringing occupational specialization, urbanization, rising educational levels, rising life expectancy, and rapid economic growth. These create a self-reinforcing process that transforms social life and political institutions, bringing

rising mass participation in politics and— in the long run— making democratic political institutions increasingly likely. Today, we have a clearer idea than ever before of why and how this process of democratization happens.

The long-term trend toward democracy has always come in surges and declines. At the start of the twentieth century, only a handful of democracies existed, and even they fell short of being full democracies by today's standards. There was a major increase in the number of democracies following World War I, another surge following World War II, and a third surge at the end of the Cold War. Each of these surges was followed by a decline, although the number of democracies never fell back to the original base line. By the start of the twenty-first century, about 90 states could be considered democratic.

Although many of these democracies are flawed, the overall trend is striking: in the long run, modernization brings democracy. This means that the economic resurgence of China and Russia has a positive aspect: underlying changes are occurring that make the emergence of increasingly liberal and democratic political systems likely in coming years. It also means that there is no reason to panic about the fact that democracy currently appears to be on the defensive. The dynamics of modernization and democracy are becoming increasingly clear, and it is unlikely that they will fail to function in the long run.

the great debate

The concept of modernization has a long history. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a Marxist theory of modernization proclaimed that the abolition of private property would put an end to exploitation, inequality and conflict. A competing capitalist version held that economic development would lead to rising living standards and democracy. These two visions of modernization competed fiercely through much of the Cold War. By the 1970s, however, communism began to stagnate, and neither economic development nor democratization was apparent in many poor countries. Neither version of utopia seemed to be emerging, and critics pronounced modernization theory dead. But since the end of the Cold War, the concept of modernization has taken on new life, and a revised version of modernization theory has emerged, with clear implications for where global economic development is likely to lead. Stripped of the oversimplifications of its early versions, the modernization concept sheds light on the recent

wave of democratization, the Democratic Peace thesis, and ongoing cultural changes, such as the rise of gender equality.

For most of human history, technological progress was extremely slow, and new developments in food production were offset by population increases – trapping agrarian economies in a steady-state equilibrium with no growth in living standards. History was seen as either cyclic or on a long-term decline from a past golden age. The situation began to change with the Industrial Revolution and the advent of sustained economic growth – which led to both the capitalist and communist vision of modernization. Although the ideologies competed fiercely, they were similarly committed to economic growth and social progress and brought mass participation in politics. And both sides believed that the developing nations of the Third World would follow a certain path to modernization.

At the height of the Cold War, a version of modernization theory emerged in the United States that portrayed underdevelopment as a direct consequence of a country's psychological and cultural traits. Underdevelopment was said to reflect irrational traditional religious and communal values that discouraged achievement. The rich Western democracies could instill modern values and bring progress to “backward” nations through economic, cultural, and military assistance. By the 1970s, however, it had become clear that assistance had not brought much progress toward prosperity or democracy—leading to a loss of confidence in the Cold War version of modernization, which was increasingly criticized as ethnocentric and patronizing. It came under heavy criticism from “dependency theorists,” who argued that trade with rich countries exploits poor countries, locking them into positions of structural dependence. The elites in developing countries welcomed such thinking, since it implied that poverty had nothing to do with internal problems or the corruption of local leaders; it was the fault of global capitalism. By the 1980s, dependency theory was in vogue. Third World nations, the thinking went, could escape from global exploitation only by withdrawing from global markets and adopting import substitution policies.

More recently, it became apparent that import substitution strategies have failed: the countries least involved with global trade, such as Cuba, North Korea, and Myanmar, have not been the most successful-- they have actually grown most slowly. Export-oriented strategies have been far more effective in bringing sustained economic growth and, eventually, democracy. The pendulum, accordingly, has swung back and a new version of modernization theory has

gained credibility. The rapid economic development of East Asia, and the subsequent democratization of Taiwan and South Korea, seem to confirm its basic claims: producing for the world market brings economic growth; investing the returns in human capital and upgrading the workforce to produce high-tech goods brings higher returns and enlarges the educated middle class; once the middle class becomes sufficiently large and articulate, it presses for liberal democracy—the most effective political system for advanced industrial societies. Nevertheless, even today if one mentions modernization at a conference on economic development, one is likely to hear a reiteration of dependency theory’s critique of the “backward nations” version of modernization theory-- as if that were all there is to modernization theory, and Marx, Weber, and Durkheim had never existed; and as if no new evidence had emerged since the 1970s.

modernization: a revised view

In retrospect, it is obvious that early versions of modernization theory were wrong on several points. Today, virtually nobody expects a revolution of the proletariat that will abolish private property, bringing a new era free from exploitation and conflict. Nor does anyone expect that industrialization will automatically bring democratic institutions; communism and fascism also emerged from industrialization. Nonetheless, a massive body of evidence suggests that modernization theory’s central premise was correct: economic development does tend to bring important, roughly predictable, changes in society, culture and politics. But earlier versions of modernization theory need to be revised in several respects.

First, modernization is not linear. It does not move indefinitely in the same direction; instead, the process reaches inflection points. Empirical evidence indicates that each phase of modernization brings distinctive changes in people’s worldviews. Industrialization leads to one major process of change, bringing bureaucratization, hierarchy, centralization of authority, secularization, and a shift from traditional to secular-rational values. The rise of postindustrial society brings another set of cultural changes that move in a different direction: instead of bureaucratization and centralization, the new trend is toward increasing emphasis on individual autonomy and self-expression values, which bring growing emancipation from authority.

Thus, other things being equal, high levels of economic development tend to make people more tolerant and trusting bringing more emphasis on self-expression and participation in decision-making. This process is not deterministic, and any forecasts can only be probabilistic, since economic factors are not the only influence; a given country’s leaders and nation-specific

events also shape what happens. Moreover, modernization's changes are not irreversible. Severe economic collapse can reverse them, as happened during the Great Depression in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain and during the 1990s in most of the Soviet successor states. Similarly, if the current economic crisis becomes a twenty-first-century Great Depression, we could face a struggle against renewed xenophobia and authoritarianism.

Second, socio-cultural change is path dependent: history matters. Although economic development tends to bring predictable changes in people's worldviews, a society's heritage—whether shaped by Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Confucianism, or Communism—leaves a lasting imprint on a society's worldview. A value system reflects an interaction between the driving forces of modernization and the persisting influence of tradition. Although the classic modernization theorists in both West and East thought that religion and ethnic traditions would die out, they have proven to be highly resilient. Although the publics of industrializing societies are becoming richer and more educated, that is hardly creating a uniform global culture. Cultural heritages are remarkably enduring.

Third, modernization is not Westernization, contrary to early ethnocentric versions of the theory. The process of industrialization began in the West, but during the past few decades, East Asia has had the world's highest economic growth rates, and Japan leads the world in life expectancy and some other aspects of modernization. The United States is not the model for global cultural changes, and industrializing societies in general are not becoming like the United States, as a popular version of modernization theory assumes. In fact, the United States retains more traditional values than most other high-income societies.

Fourth, modernization does not automatically bring democracy. Rather, it, in the long run, brings social and cultural changes that make democracy increasingly probable. Simply attaining a high level of per capita GDP does not produce democracy: if it did, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates would be model democracies. (These countries have not gone through the modernization process described above.) But the emergence of postindustrial society brings certain social and cultural changes that are specifically conducive to democratization. Knowledge societies cannot function effectively without highly-educated publics who become increasingly accustomed to thinking for themselves. Furthermore, rising levels of economic security bring a growing emphasis on a syndrome of self-expression values – one that gives high priority to free choice and motivates political action. Beyond a certain point, accordingly, it

becomes difficult to avoid democratization, because repressing mass demands for more open societies becomes increasingly costly and detrimental to economic effectiveness. Thus, in its advanced stages, modernization brings social and cultural changes that lead to the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions.

The core idea of modernization is that economic and technological development bring a coherent set of social and political changes. A large body of empirical evidence supports this idea. Economic development is, indeed, strongly linked with pervasive changes in people's beliefs and motivations, and these changes are reshaping the role of religion, job motivations, human fertility rates, gender roles, and sexual norms. And they also bring growing mass demands for democratic institutions and more responsive behavior by elites. These changes together make democracy increasingly likely to emerge, while also making war less acceptable to publics.

empirical evidence of cultural change

New sources of empirical evidence provide valuable insight concerning how modernization changes worldviews and motivations. One important source is based on global surveys of mass values and attitudes. From 1981 to 2007, the World Values Survey and the European Values Study carried out five waves of representative national surveys in scores of countries, containing almost 90 percent of the world's population. The results show large cross-national differences in what people believe and value. In some countries, 95 percent of the people say that God is very important in their lives; in others, only 3 percent do. In some societies, 90 percent of the people believe that men have more right to a job than women do; in others, only 8 percent think so. These cross-national differences are robust and enduring, and they are closely correlated with a society's level of economic development: people in low-income societies are much likelier to emphasize religion and traditional gender roles than are people in rich countries.


The values surveys demonstrate that the worldviews of people living in rich societies differ systematically from those of low-income societies across a wide range of political, social, and religious norms. The differences run along two basic dimensions: traditional versus secular-rational values, and survival versus self-expression values. (Each dimension reflects responses to scores of questions asked as part of the values surveys.) The shift from traditional to secular-rational values is linked to the shift from agrarian to industrial society. Traditional societies

emphasize religion, traditional values, and respect for and obedience to authority values; they tend to reject abortion and have high levels of national pride. These characteristics change become more secular and rational.

The shift from survival to self-expression values is linked with the rise of postindustrial society. It reflects a cultural shift that occurs when younger generations emerge who have grown up taking survival for granted. Survival values give top priority to economic and physical security and conformist social norms. Self-expression values give high priority to freedom of expression, participation in decision making, political activism, environmental protection, gender equality, and growing tolerance of ethnic minorities, foreigners, gays and lesbians. Growing emphasis on these values produces a culture of trust and tolerance in which people place high value on individual freedom and self-expression and have activist political orientations. These attributes are crucial to democracy – and thus explain how economic growth, which takes societies from agrarian to industrial and then from industrial to post-industrial, leads to democratization. The unprecedented economic growth of the past 50 years has meant that an increasing share of the world's population has grown up taking survival for granted. Time series data from the values surveys indicates that mass priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression, participation in decision-making and a relatively trusting and tolerant outlook

Both dimensions are closely linked with economic development: the value systems of high-income countries differ dramatically from those of low-income countries. Every nation that the World Bank defines as high income ranks relatively high on both dimensions -- with a strong emphasis on both self-expression and secular-rational values. All of the low-income and lower-middle income societies rank relatively low on both dimensions. The upper-middle income countries fall somewhere in between. To a remarkable degree, the values and beliefs of a given society reflect its level of economic development—just as modernization theory implies.

This strong linkage between value systems and per capita GDP suggests that economic development tends to produce roughly predictable changes in a society's beliefs and values—and time-series evidence supports this hypothesis. When one compares the positions of given countries in successive waves of the values surveys from 1981 to 2007, one finds that almost all of the countries that experienced rising per capita GDP also experienced predictable changes in their values.



The values survey evidence also shows, however, that cultural change is path-dependent; a society's cultural heritage also shapes where it falls on the global cultural map. This map shows distinctive clusters of countries, reflecting Protestant Europe, Catholic Europe, ex-communist Europe, English-speaking countries, Latin America, South Asian, Islamic and African cultural clusters. The values emphasized by different societies fall into a remarkably coherent pattern that reflects both economic development and religious and colonial heritage. Still, even if a society's cultural heritage continues to shape its prevailing values, economic development brings changes that have important consequences. Over time, it reshapes religious beliefs, job motivations, fertility rates, gender roles, and sexual norms -- and it brings growing mass demands for democratic institutions and more responsive elite behavior. And during the 25 years covered by the values surveys, the peoples of most countries placed increasing emphasis on Self-expression values. This cultural shift makes democracy increasingly likely to emerge where it does not yet exist, and to become more effective and more direct where it does.

development and democracy

Fifty years ago, the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset pointed out that rich countries are much likelier than poor countries to be democracies. Although this claim was contested for many years, it has held up against repeated tests. The causal direction of the relationship has also been questioned: are rich countries likelier to be democratic because democracy makes countries rich, or is development conducive to democracy? Today, it seems clear that the causal sequence works mainly from economic development to democratization. During early industrialization, authoritarian states are just as likely to attain high rates of growth as are democracies. But beyond a certain level, democracy becomes increasingly likely to emerge and survive. Thus, among the scores of countries that democratized around 1990, most were middle income countries: almost all of the high-income countries already *were* democracies, and few low-income countries made the transition. Moreover, among the countries that democratized between 1970 and 1990, democracy has survived in every country at the economic level of Argentina or higher; among the countries below this level, democracy had a mean life expectancy of only eight years.

The strong correlation between development and democracy reflects the fact that economic development is conducive to democracy. The question of *why*, exactly, development leads to democracy has been debated intensely, but the answer is beginning to emerge. It does not result from some disembodied force that causes democratic institutions to emerge automatically when a country attains a certain level of GDP. Rather, economic development brings sociopolitical changes only insofar as it changes people's behavior. Consequently, economic development is conducive to democracy insofar as it, first, creates a large, educated, and articulate middle class of people who are accustomed to thinking for themselves and, second, transforms people's values and motivations.

Today, it is more possible than ever before to measure what the key changes are and how far they have progressed in given countries. Multivariate analysis of the data from the values surveys makes it possible to sort out the relative impact of economic, social, and cultural changes, and the results point to the conclusion that the economic development is conducive to democracy insofar as it brings specific structural changes (particularly the rise of the knowledge sector) and certain cultural changes (particularly the rise of self-expression values). Wars,

depressions, institutional changes, elite decisions, and specific leaders also influence what happens—but cultural change is the major factor in the emergence and survival of democracy.

Modernization brings rising educational levels, moving the work force into occupations that require independent thinking and making people more articulate and better equipped to intervene in politics. As knowledge societies emerge, people become accustomed to using their own initiative and judgment on the job, and are also increasingly likely to question rigid and hierarchical authority.

Modernization also makes people economically more secure, and self-expression values become increasingly widespread when a large share of the population grows up taking survival for granted. The desire for freedom and autonomy are universal aspirations. They may be subordinated to the needs for subsistence and order when survival is precarious, but they take increasingly high priority as survival becomes increasingly secure. The basic motivation for democracy--the human desire for free choice—starts to play an increasingly important role. People place growing emphasize on free choice in politics and demand civil and political liberties and democratic institutions.


effective democracy

During the explosion of democracy that took place from 1987 to 1995, electoral democracy spread rapidly throughout the world. Strategic elite agreements played an important role in this process, facilitated by an international environment in which the end of the Cold War opened the way for democratization. Initially, there was a tendency to view any regime that holds free and fair elections as a democracy. But many of the new democracies suffer from massive corruption and fail to apply the rule of law that makes democracy effective. A growing number of observers thus emphasize the inadequacy of “electoral democracy,” “hybrid democracy,” “authoritarian democracy,” and other forms of sham democracy in which mass preferences are something that political elites can largely ignore, and not a decisive influence on government decisions, as democratic theory implies. It is important, accordingly, to distinguish between effective and ineffective democracies.

The essence of democracy is that it empowers ordinary citizens. Effective democracy reflects not only the extent to which civil and political rights exist on paper, but also the degree to which officials actually respect these rights. The first of these two components—the existence

of rights on paper—is measured by the annual Freedom House rankings: if a society holds free elections, Freedom House tends to rate it as “free,” giving it scores at or near the top of its scale. Thus, the new democracies in Eastern Europe receive scores as high as those of the established democracies of Western Europe, although in-depth analyses show that widespread corruption makes these new democracies far less effective in responding to their citizens’ choices. Fortunately, the World Bank’s Effective Governance scores measure of the extent to which democratic institutions are actually effective. Consequently, a rough index of effective democracy can be obtained by multiplying these two scores – formal democracy, as measured by Freedom House, and elite and institutional integrity, as measured by the World Bank.

Effective democracy is a considerably more demanding standard than electoral democracy. One can establish electoral democracy almost anywhere, but it will probably not last long if it does not transfer power from the elites to the people. Effective democracy is most likely to exist alongside a relatively developed infrastructure that includes not only economic resources but also widespread participatory habits and an emphasis on autonomy. Accordingly, it is closely linked to the extent that a given public emphasizes self-expression values. Indeed, the correlation between a people’s values and political institutions is remarkably strong.



Virtually all of the stable democracies show strong self-expression values. Most Latin American countries are “under-achievers,” showing lower levels of effective democracy than their publics' values would predict. This suggests that these societies could support higher levels of democracy if rule of law were strengthened there. Iran is also an underachiever -- a theocratic regime that allows much lower levels of democracy than those to which its people aspire. Surprising as it may seem to those who focus only on elite-level politics, the Iranian public shows relatively strong support for democracy. Conversely, Estonia, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania are "overachievers," showing higher levels of democracy than their publics' values would predict--perhaps reflecting the incentives to democratization provided by membership in the European Union.

But do self-expression values lead to democracy, or does democracy cause self-expression values to emerge? The evidence indicates that the causal linkage is mainly from self-expression values to democracy.¹ Democratic institutions do not need to be in place for self-expression values to emerge. Time series evidence from the values surveys indicates that in the years preceding the 1988-1992 wave of democratization, self-expression values had emerged through a process of intergenerational value change--not only in Western democracies, but also within many authoritarian societies. By 1990, the publics of East Germany and Czechoslovakia—living under two of the most authoritarian regimes in the world—had developed high levels of self-expression values. The crucial factor was not the political system, but the fact that these countries were among the most economically advanced countries in the communist world, with high levels of education and advanced social welfare systems. Thus, when Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, removing the threat of Soviet military intervention, they moved swiftly toward democracy.

In recent decades, self-expression values have been spreading and getting stronger, making people more likely to directly intervene in politics. (Indeed, unprecedented numbers of people took place in the demonstrations that helped bring about the wave of democratization that took place from 1988 to 1992.) Does this mean that authoritarian systems will inevitably crumble? Not inevitably. Rising emphasis on self-expression values tends to erode the legitimacy of authoritarian systems, but as long as determined authoritarian elites control the army and secret police, they can repress pro-democratic forces. Still, even repressive regimes find it costly to check these tendencies, for doing so tends to block the emergence of an effective knowledge sector.

Modernization's implications

This new understanding of modernization has broad implications for international relations. For one thing, it helps explain why advanced democracies do not fight one another. Recent research provides strong empirical support for this claim, which goes back to Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant. Since they emerged in the early nineteenth century, liberal democracies have fought a

¹ For empirical evidence of this claim, see R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy* (Cambridge University Press, 2005). For more information on the values surveys, or to download the data, visit <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>

number of wars, but almost never against each other. But this new version of modernization theory indicate the democratic peace phenomenon is more due to cultural changes linked with modernization than to democracy per se.

In earlier periods of history, democracies fought each other frequently. But prevailing norms have evolved over time, as is illustrated by the abolition of slavery, the gradual expansion of the franchise, and the movement toward gender equality in virtually all modern societies. Another cultural change in modernized societies—which tend to be democracies—is that war has become progressively less acceptable and people have become more likely express this preference and try to make it a decisive impact on policies. Evidence from the World Values Surveys indicates that the publics of high income countries have much lower levels of xenophobia than do the publics of low-income countries, and they are much less willing to fight for their country than are the publics of low-income countries. Moreover, economically developed democracies are far more peaceful toward each other than are poor democracies, and economically developed democracies are far less prone to civil war than are poor democracies.

Modernization theory has both encouraging and cautionary implications for U.S. foreign policy. Iraq, of course, provides a cautionary lesson. Contrary to the appealing view that democratization can readily be established almost anywhere, modernization theory implies that democracy is much likelier to flourish under certain conditions than others. A number of factors made it unrealistic to expect that democracy would be easy to establish in Iraq, including deep ethnic cleavages that had been exacerbated by Saddam's regime. And after Saddam's defeat, allowing physical security to collapse was a particularly serious mistake. Interpersonal trust and tolerance flourish when people feel secure. Democracy is unlikely to survive in a society torn by distrust and intolerance, and Iraq currently manifests the highest level of xenophobia of any society for which data are available. A good indicator of xenophobia is the extent to which people say they would not want to have foreigners as neighbors. Across 80 countries, the median percentage saying this is 15 percent. Among Iraqi Kurds, 51 percent reject having foreigners as neighbors. Among Iraqi Arabs, 90 percent say they would not want foreigners as neighbors. In keeping with these conditions, Iraq (along with Zimbabwe and Pakistan) shows very low levels of both self-expression values and effective democracy.

Modernization theory also has positive implications for U.S. foreign policy. Supported by a large body of evidence, it points to the conclusion that economic development is a basic driver

of democratic change—meaning that Washington should do what it can to encourage development. If it wants to bring democratic change to Cuba, for example, isolating it is counterproductive. The United States should lift the embargo, promote economic development, and foster social engagement and connection to the world. Nothing is certain, but empirical evidence suggests that a growing sense of security and growing emphasis on self-expression values will undermine the authoritarian regime.

Similarly, although many observers have been alarmed by the economic resurgence of China, this growth has positive implications for the long term. Beneath China's seemingly monolithic political structure, the social infrastructure of democratization is emerging, and it has progressed farther than most observers realize. In terms of mass orientations, China is now approaching the level of mass emphasis on self-expression values at which Chile, Poland, South Korea, and Taiwan made transitions to democracy. And, surprising as it may seem to observers who focus only on elite-level politics, Iran is also near this threshold. As long as the Chinese Communist Party and Iran's theocratic leaders control their countries' military and security forces, democratic institutions will not emerge at the national level. But growing mass pressures for liberalization are emerging, and repressing them will have growing costs in terms of economic efficiency and public morale.

On the whole, growing prosperity for China is favorable to the U.S. national interest. More broadly, modernization theory implies that the United States should welcome and encourage economic development around the world. Although it requires difficult adjustments, the long term effects encourage the emergence of more tolerant, less xenophobic, and ultimately more democratic societies.